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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over Big Sky's appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). On April 6, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and Rule 42 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (granting jurisdiction over "cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from 
the Supreme Court"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE NO. 1. 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Lawyers Title and 
correctly denied Big Sky's Cross-motion for Summary Judgment because Big Sky's 
Amended Complaint did not assert any statutory claims or common law claims for 
vicarious liability against Lawyers Title. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews the district court's determination 
on summary judgment for correctness. See, e.g., Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 
UT8,1J20, 70P.3dl. 
ISSUE NO. 2. 
The trial court acted well within its discretion under Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to deny the Motion to Amend, because Big Sky's motion was untimely 
and would have prejudiced Lawyers Title, and also because Big Sky did not have an 
adequate justification for delay in bringing its claims. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: An abuse of discretion standard applies to a trial 
court's Rule 15(a) analysis. Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, Inc., 2004 
UT App 354,1[31, 101P.3d371. 
ISSUE NO. 3. 
The trial court also correctly determined on an independent basis under Rule 15(c), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the proposed amendment would have been futile 
because Big Sky was barred by the statutes of limitation from bringing claims against 
Lawyers Title for vicarious and statutory liability. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A correctness standard applies to a trial court's Rule 
15(c) analysis. Gary Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, Inc., 2004 UT App 354, 
TJ31, 101 P.3d371. 
ISSUE NO. 4. 
Big Sky has waived its "identity of interest'' argument. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
'[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue." [citation omitted] This requirements puts 
the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for correction at 
that time in the course of the proceeding, [citation omitted] For a trial court 
to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error '(1) the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and 
(3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority." [citation omitted]. Issues that are not raised at trial are 
usually deemed waived, [citation omitted]. 
483 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, Tf51, 99 P.3d 801. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case/ Course of Proceedings, 
Big Sky appeals from an Order entered by Judge W. Brent West of the Second 
Judicial Court, which granted Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed 
Lawyers Title as a party from the litigation, and denied Big Sky's Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance, and Motion to Amend 
Complaint. (R572-77). The trial court certified this Order as final. (R694-99). 
On November 21, 1997, Big Sky filed a Complaint against Avis & Archibald Title 
Insurance Agency ("Avis & Archibald") and Jayson Cherry for negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty stemming from Avis & Archibald's and Mr. Cherry's release of funds held 
in escrow by Avis & Archibald to Wayne Ogden. (R001-006). Big Sky did not name 
Lawyers Title as a defendant in the 1997 Complaint. 
In Octobei 1999, Big Sky moved foi paitial summary judgment against Avis and 
Archibald as to liability. (R046-103). The trial court granted Big Sky's Motion, and 
determined that Avis & Archibald was liable to Big Sky for release of the escrow funds. 
(Rl34-37) In November 1999, Avis & Archibald's counsel withdrew from the litigation. 
(R138-40). 
Two years later, on January 10, 2002, Big Sky moved the trial court for leave to 
amend its Complaint to add Lawyers Title as a defendant. (R144-58). The trial court 
3 
granted Big Sky's motion (R167), and Big Sky served Lawyers Title on March 19, 2002. 
(R173). Lawyers Title filed its answer on April 10, 2002. (R185-191). 
During the next fifteen months, Big Sky conducted no discovery. Except for the 
May 21, 2002 Answer that Fireman's Fund Insurance Company filed to the Amended 
Complaint, no further proceedings took place in the case. 
On July 23, 2003, Lawyers Title filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R204-
206). Big Sky opposed Lawyers Title's motion by filing its own Cross-motion for 
Summary Judgment, claiming that Lawyers Title was liable under Utah Code Ann. 
Section 31 A-23-308, renumbered 31 A-23a-407 (2003),1 the title insurer liability statute, 
and under common law agency principles, for Avis & Archibald's release of the escrow 
funds. (R334-61). In its memorandum, Big Sky asked for leave to amend to assert these 
claims. (R340-41). Big Sky also requested additional time under Rule 56(f), "if 
necessary/* to obtain discovery to oppose Lawyers Title's motion. (R334-35; 341-42). 
After Lawyers Title filed its Reply Memorandum supporting its Summary 
Judgment Motion, Big Sky filed a motion seeking leave to amend its pleadings to assert 
its new claims. (R310). 
After oral argument, (R720), the trial court granted Lawyers Title's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and denied Big Sky's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Rule 
1
 This Brief shall refer to this section of the Utah Code as Section 31 A-23-308. 
The statute is reproduced in Appendix E. 
4 
56(f) Motion for Continuance, and Motion to Amend Complaint. (R572-77). The trial 
court has certified this Order as final (R694-99). Big Sky appeals the trial court's Order 
(R674-78). 
Statement of Facts. 
1. In April of 1997, Avis & Archibald Title Insurance Agency ("Avis & 
Archibald"), in an "off again on again" real estate transaction, released funds that it held 
in behalf of Big Sky to a third party, violating Big Sky's escrow instructions to Avis & 
Archibald. (R52-53;R135) 
BIG SKY'S ORIGINAL 1997 COMPLAINT 
2. On November 21, 1997, Big Sky brought suit against Avis & Archibald and 
its employee Jayson Cherry, alleging causes of action against them for negligence, 
stemming from Avis & Archibald's release of the escrow funds. (R001-006) 
3. Big Sky did not name Lawyeis Title as a defendant in the Complaint. 
4. On October 22, 1999, Big Sky moved for summary judgment against Avis 
& Archibald. (R049-57). 
5. On January 10, 2000, the trial court executed the Order granting Big Sky's 
summary judgment. (Rl 34-36) 
6. In or about November 2000, Avis & Archibald ceased doing business and 
its counsel, Robin Nalder, withdrew. (R138-39; R365) 
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BIG SKY'S REQUEST FOR INFORMA TION REGARDING A VIS AND ARCHIBALD'S 
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS POLICY 
7. On April 4, 2001, Big Sky contacted Lawyers Title to request information 
regarding Avis and Archibald's errors and omissions policy ("E&O Policy") issued by 
Fireman's Fund Insurance. (R208) 
8. Lawyers Title provided the information to Big Sky on April 5, 2001. (R208-
09) 
9. On April 13, 2001, Big Sky informed Lawyers Title that Big Sky was 
looking to Fireman's Fund and Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy to satisfy its claim 
regarding the Big Sky v. Avis and Archibald matter (as referenced at the top of the letter). 
(R224) Big Sky also requested additional information regarding the E&O Policy, which 
Lawyers Title provided in May 2001 (R224; R208-09) 
10. After Big Sky's April 13th letter, it made no other requests to Lawyers Title 
for information regarding Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy. (R209) 
BIG SKY'S 2002 AMENDED COMPLAINT 
11. Two years after the trial court had entered judgment for liability against 
Avis & Archibald, Big Sky obtained leave from the trial court in January 2002 to amend 
its Complaint to add Lawyers Title for "fraud." (R144-46) 
12. Big Sky's only cause of action against Lawyers Title in the Amended 
Complaint is the Sixth Cause of Action, which states as follows: 
6 
15. [Big Sky] has attempted to file a claim under Avis & 
Archibald's professional liability policy but has been unable to get the 
policy or policy number from the Defendant insurance companies. 
44. Lawyers Title . . . knew that Defendant Firemen's Fund's agent, 
Defendant TitlePac, had issued a professional liability insurance policy to 
Defendant Avis & Archibald that was in full force and effect at the time of 
[Big Sky's] claim. 
45. Lawyers Title . . . ha[s] fraudulently attempted to conceal from 
[Big Sky] that a professional liability insurance policy exists for Defendant 
Avis & Archibald to cover [Big Sky's] claim, which fraud has damaged 
[Big Sky] in an amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial. 
46. Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary under any and all policies of 
insurance issued by Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and Title Pac, and that 
[sic] these parties are contractually liable for their insurance liabilities. 
(R176; R180-81) (Appendix B). 
In the prayer for relief, Big Sky asked: 
3. For a finding that Defendants Lawyers'Title, Fireman's Fund 
and Title Pac is [sic] liable for damages incurred by their insured and that 
they committed a fraud upon Plaintiff in relation to the denial of Plaintiffs 
claim for damages in relation to the escrowed funds and the unwillingness 
to produce a policy or policy number for such insurance. 
(Rl 82) (emphasis added). 
13. Lawyers Title was served with the Amended Complaint on March 19, 2002 
and filed its answer on April 10, 2002. (R173-91). 
14. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company filed its answer to the Amended 
Complaint on May 21, 2002. 
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15. No further proceedings took place for the next fifteen months. Specifically, 
Big Sky did not undertake any discovery. (Record Index). 
LA WYERS' TITLE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
16. On July 23, 2003, Lawyers Title filed its summary judgment motion on the 
only claim asserted against it, fraudulent nondisclosure. (R207-11) 
17. In its supporting memorandum, Lawyers Title noted that the first time Big 
Sky had contacted Lawyers Title concerning Avis & Archibald's E&O Policy was on 
April 4, 2001. (R208) Lawyers Title provided evidence that it had provided all of the 
information that Big Sky requested concerning the E&O Policy, and that after it received 
that information, Big Sky made no other requests for information. (R208-09) 
18. In opposition to Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment: 
a. Big Sky admitted that Lawyers Title had not attempted to 
fiaudulently conceal the existence of the E&O Policy, but had piovided Big Sky 
with all of the information Big Sky had requested regarding Avis & Archibald's 
E&O Policy. (R335) Big Sky also admitted that the first time it contacted 
Lawyers Title regarding the E&O Policy was on April 4, 2001. (R335); 
b. Big Sky raised new claims and issues to oppose Lawyers Title's 
Motion and moved for summary judgment on these novel claims. (R720; R572) 
Specifically, Big Sky sought summary judgment against Lawyers Title under Utah 
8 
Code Ann § 31A-23-308, the title insurer liability statute, and under common law 
agency principles. (R336-40); 
c. Near the end of its opposing memorandum, Big Sky asked the trial 
court for leave to amend. (R340-41) Big Sky's request for leave to amend 
contained no motion, no mention of Rule 15, and no proposed Amended 
Complaint. (R340-41) 
19. Lawyers Title then filed a consolidated memorandum, which included its 
final reply supporting its own summary judgment motion, and also opposition to Big 
Sky's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter "Reply Memorandum"). Lawyers 
Title provided factual support for and argued that: 
a. The facts entitling Lawyers Title to summary judgment were 
uncontested. (R267); 
b. Big Sky had not asserted in its Amended Complaint claims against 
Lawyers Title under Section 31A-23-308 or under common law agency principles, 
and that Big Sky was attempting to raise novel claims or theories for recovery in 
its opposition to Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R271-73); 
c. Utah law expressly precluded a party from amending the complaint 
by raising novel claims or theories for recovery in a memorandum in opposition to 
a motion for summary judgment. (R271-72 {citing Holmes Dev. LLC v. Cook, 
2002 UT 38, If 31, 48 P.3d 895)). 
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d. Big Sky's potential claims were time-barred. (R273-74); 
e. Lawyers Title had no liability under common law agency principles 
for Avis & Archibald's release of the funds in escrow, as the agency agreement 
between Lawyers Title and Avis & Archibald expressly provided that Avis & 
Archibald was not Lawyers Title's agent for escrow purposes. (R274-77; R283-
85; R287; R291 U 6); and finally, 
f. Big Sky's cursory request for leave to amend at the end of its 
opposing memorandum did not rise to the level of a motion for leave to amend and 
should be denied. (R273 (quotingHolmes, 2002 UT 38, at 1f 59)) 
BIG SKY'S MOTION TO AMEND ITS AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
20. After Lawyers Title had pointed out in its final brief regarding the summary 
judgment motion that Big Sky's request for leave to amend was ineffectual under the 
rules, Big Sky then filed a Motion to Amend its Amended Complaint. (R310-11). In its 
supporting Memorandum, Big Sky did not address Lawyers Title's argument that the new 
proposed causes of action were time-barred. Big Sky also did not argue that the new 
claims should or would relate back. (R313-15) 
21. Opposing Big Sky's Motion to Amend, Lawyers Title provided factual 
support for and argued, inter alia, that: 
a. Big Sky had had all the information necessary to bring its purported 
claim under Section 31A-23-308 in 1997 (R390-91); Big Sky's purported injury 
10 
had occurred more than six years prior (R387); more than one year had passed 
since Lawyers Title was brought into the litigation and Big Sky had conducted no 
discovery (R386); and Big Sky was "aware of the new issues raised in [its 
Second] [A]mended Complaint long before [Big Sky]'s Motion was filed'" (R390 
{quoting Bronson v. Jones, 2000 UT App 284, 2000 WL 33244137 (Memorandum 
Decision)) 
b. Big Sky's delay in bringing its untimely Motion was unjustifiable. 
(R390-91) 
c. Allowing Big Sky leave to amend would unduly prejudice Lawyers 
Title (R392): Specifically, Big Sky's unjustifiable delay in bringing these new 
claims had left Lawyers Title without redress, because Avis & Archibald was no 
longer in business (R392); and, Lawyers Title would be unduly prejudiced by 
having to prepare a defense to claims stemming from a purported act that had 
taken place more than six years earlier. (R393) 
d. Big Sky's proposed Section 31A-23-308 claim and common law 
agency claim against Lawyers Title were legally insufficient and futile. (R393-96 
{citing Analdex Res., Inc. v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994))). 
(R393-96). 
22. In its Reply Memorandum supporting its Motion to Amend (R422-34), Big 
Sky asserted in a single sentence, with no citation to Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
11 
Procedure or any legal authority, that "any amended cause of action relates back to the 
original filing." (R432) 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER. 
23. On July 12, 2004, the trial court issued its Order (Appendix A), in which it: 
a. Granted Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
finding, inter alia, that the undisputed facts showed that Lawyers Title "made no 
attempt to secret away or fraudulently conceal information concerning the 
existence of Avis & Archibald's E&O Policy." (R573) 
b. Denied Big Sky's Rule 56(f) request on the basis that the 
supporting affidavit was insufficient. (R574). 
c. Denied Big Sky's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment 
finding that Big Sky, in its Amended Complaint, failed to plead causes of action 
against Lawyers Title under Section 31A-23-308, or under "an agency theory/' 
(R574-75) 
d. Denied Big Sky's Motion to Amend. The trial court's ruling 
in this regard was as follows: 
Having reviewed the requisite three factors for determining the 
merits of Big Sky's Motion to Amend, specifically, Big Sky's 
timeliness in bringing its Motion; Big Sky's justification for delay; 
and any resulting prejudice to LTIC if the Court should grant Big 
Sky's Motion, the Court issues the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
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A. Timeliness: The Court concludes that Big Sky's Motion to Amend is 
untimely. Big Sky had a potential statutory cause of action against 
LTIC under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, renumbered as Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-23-407, from the onset of the present litigation. 
However, Big Sky elected not to assert that statutory claim until 
LTIC moved for summary judgment to dismiss the sole claim 
asserted against it, nearly seven years after filing its initial 
Complaint. Big Sky's request for leave to amend is untimely. 
B. Justification for Delay: The Court acknowledges that Big Sky was 
involved in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding related to the 
present matter; however, Big Sky's involvement in that proceeding 
does not provide adequate justification for Big Sky's delay in 
seeking leave to amend its Amended Complaint. As stated above, 
Big Sky had a potential statutory cause of action well before it filed 
the present Motion to Amend. 
The Court concludes that Big Sky has failed to show 
justification for its untimely Motion. 
C. Prejudice: The Court concludes that were it to grant Big Sky's 
Motion to Amend, doing so would unduly prejudice LTIC, because 
Big Sky's potential Section [31 A-23-308] claim would be barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations allowing Big Sky to bring a 
legally futile claim; LTIC would have to prepare a defense to new 
claims being asserted at this lime; although the events leading to 
these new causes of action occurred nearly seven years ago; and 
LTIC will likely have difficulty locating witnesses and documents. 
For these reasons the Court concludes that LTIC would be unduly 
prejudiced were this Court to grant Big Sky's Motion to Amend. 
(R575-76) (Appendix A). 
24. On March 31, 2005, ten days after the trial court had certified its July 30, 
2004 Order as final (R694-99), Big Sky filed its Notice of Appeal. (R674-78). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. BIG SKY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DID NOT ASSERT ANY 
STATUTORY CLAIMS OR ANY COMMON LAW CLAIMS FOR 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AGAINST LAWYERS TITLE. 
No claims against Lawyers Title for statutory or common law vicarious liability 
claims can be reasonably inferred from the language of the Amended Complaint. Big 
Sky's objection on appeal is that the trial court did not stretch the language of the 
pleading to find such allegations against Lawyers Title. In making this argument to this 
Court, Big Sky has not set forth the pleading requirements for either cause of action. And 
other than urging that such causes of action can be reasonably inferred from the language, 
Big Sky has never stated, here or below, how its Amended Complaint adequately met 
those requirements. As such this Court should decline to address the issue altogether. 
If this Court does reach the issue, Big Sky has not met the pleading requirements 
of Rule 8(a),U.R.Civ.P. The Amended Complaint docs not mention any statutory liability 
and does not contain a single factual assertion that would support liability under Section 
31A-23-308. There is no allegation that Avis & Archibald was Lawyers Title's agent -
the only relationship between Lawyers Title and Avis & Archibald that is alleged is one 
of insurer and insured, i.e., that Lawyers Title should pay the damages that Big Sky 
incurred pursuant to any insurance policy that it may have issued to Avis & Archibald. 
Lawyers Title never had fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim under 
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Section 31 A-23-308 or under any agency theory. The trial court correctly found that the 
Amended Complaint did not include these causes of action. 
II. THESE CAUSES OF ACTION EXISTED IN 1997, WHEN BIG SKY 
COMMENCED THIS LITIGATION. 
"A cause of action accrues when 'it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when 
the claim is in such condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim 
is established."5 Dept ofNatural Resources v. Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co., 52 P.3d 
1257, 1264 (Utah 2002) (citation omitted). Big Sky's statutory and vicarious liability 
causes of action existed in 1997, when this action was commenced. 
Big Sky's argument that it did not have claims against Lawyers Title until its 
damages were certain relies on events that occurred after the original complaint was filed. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that Big Sky's allegations of vicarious 
and statutory liability against Lawyers Title existed at the inception of this litigation in 
1997. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT HAD SEVERAL INDEPENDENT BASES ON 
WHICH EXERCISED ITS BROAD DISCRETION TO DENY BIG SKY'S 
UNTIMELY MOTION TO AMEND. 
The decision whether to grant or deny leave to amend a pleading pursuant to Rule 
15(a) is within the broad discretion of the trial court. Trial courts consider the three well-
established factors in making such a determination: Timeliness, justification, and 
prejudice. A court's ruling can be predicated on only one or two of the factors. 
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Here, the trial court denied Big Sky's motion to amend on each of these three 
bases, and made specific findings regarding each of these factors. The trial court's 
finding on any one of those factors is sufficient alone to justify its ruling. The trial court 
acted well within its discretion in denying Big Sky's Motion. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO 
AMEND BECAUSE BIG SKY'S CLAIMS FOR VICARIOUS AND 
STATUTORY LIABILITY ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
The trial court also addressed another independent factor in denying Big Sky's 
Motion to Amend, i.e., that Big Sky's attempts to assert its new allegations against 
Lawyers Title were futile. Because Big Sky's potential causes of action against Lawyers 
Title existed in 1997, the claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 
V. BIG SKY CANNOT SAVE ITS CLAIMS BY ARGUING THAT THEY 
SHOULD HAVE RELATED BACK. 
A. BIG SKY DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ARGUMENT BELOW. 
Big Sky's "argument" to the trial court on this issue was raised in its Reply 
Memorandum supporting its Motion to Amend, and was comprised of a single sentence, 
with no citation to Rule 15(c), U.R.Civ.P. or any other legal authority, and no analysis of 
any sort at all. Accordingly, this Court should deem Big Sky's argument waived. 
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B. BIG SKY'S "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" ARGUMENT HAS BEEN 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Failing to brief the issue below, Big Sky asserts for the first time on appeal that 
Avis & Archibald and Lawyers Title allegedly share an "identity of interest." This Court 
should decline to consider this argument. Big Sky has not argued "plain error or 
exceptional circumstances" in its opening Brief, as required by the Court to consider this 
new argument. 
C. BIG SKY CANNOT DEMONSTRATE ANY "IDENTITY OF 
INTEREST" BETWEEN AVIS & ARCHIBALD AND LAWYERS 
TITLE SUFFICIENT FOR THE CLAIMS TO HAVE RELATED 
BACK. 
Even if this Court were to reach the issue, Big Sky's relation-back argument fails. 
For an identity of interest to exist under Utah law, the two parties must share the "same 
legal interest," meaning the legal position and defenses of the two parties must be the 
same. 
Big Sky argues only that there is an identity of interest because Lawyers Title 
knew about the complaint against Avis & Archibald before it was made a party to the 
litigation and that Lawyers Title would not be "prejudiced" by the relation back. 
Assuming arguendo that Lawyers Title did know about the complaint, this is not enough 
to meet the requirements to show an identity of interest. Lawyers Title does not share the 
same legal interests as Avis & Archibald in the outcome of the litigation, and a 
disposition as to one would not necessarily affect the claims or defenses available to the 
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other. Lawyers Title had defenses not available to Avis & Archibald, and vice versa. 
Thus, no identity of interest exists between Avis & Archibald and Lawyers Title. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BIG SKY'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DID NOT ASSERT ANY 
STATUTORY CLAIMS OR ANY COMMON LAW CLAIMS FOR 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY AGAINST LAWYERS TITLE. 
Big Sky argues that its Amended Complaint includes statutory or other common 
law vicarious liability claims against Lawyers Title (Appellant's Brief, p. 33-37). But no 
such claims can be reasonably inferred from the language of the Amended Complaint. 
Big Sky's only cause of action against Lawyers Title in the Amended Complaint is the 
Sixth Cause of Action, which states as follows: 
15. [Big Sky] has attempted to file a claim under Avis & 
Archibald's professional liability policy but has been unable to get the 
policy or policy number from the Defendant insurance companies. 
44. Lawyers Title . . . knew that Defendant Firemen's Fund's agent, 
Defendant TitlePac, had issued a professional liability insurance policy to 
Defendant Avis & Archibald that was in full force and effect at the time of 
[Big Sky's] claim. 
45. Lawyers Title . . . ha[s] fraudulently attempted to conceal from 
[Big Sky] that a professional liability insurance policy exists for Defendant 
Avis & Archibald to cover [Big Sky's] claim, which fraud has damaged 
[Big Sky] in an amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial. 
46. Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary under any and all policies of 
insurance issued by Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and Title Pac, and that 
[sic] these parties are contractually liable for their insurance liabilities. 
(Rl 76; Rl 80-81) (Appendix B). 
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In the prayer for relief, Big Sky asked: 
3. For a finding that Defendants Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and 
Title Pac is [sic] liable for damages incurred by their insured and that they 
committed a fraud upon Plaintiff in relation to the denial of Plaintiff s claim 
for damages in relation to the escrowed funds and the unwillingness to 
produce a policy or policy number for such insurance. 
(R182) (emphasis added) (Appendix B). 
This language does state a claim against Lawyers Title for fraudulent concealment, 
which the trial court dismissed because the undisputed facts showed that Lawyers Title 
made no attempt to conceal information from Big Sky. (R573). Big Sky makes no 
argument on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing this claim. The language also 
states a claim that Lawyers Title is liable for damages caused by "their insured" pursuant 
to any insurance policy it may have issued to Avis & Archibald. Big Sky never proffered 
any evidence that Lawyers Title had, in fact, issued an insurance policy to Avis & 
Archibald. Instead, Big Sky asked for a Rule 56(f) continuance (R341-42), which the 
trial court denied because the supporting Rule 56(e) affidavit lacked foundation and 
specificity. (R574). Big Sky does not challenge this decision on appeal, either.2 
Big Sky's objection on appeal is that the trial court did not stretch the language of 
the pleading to find an allegation that Lawyers Title had statutory liability under Section 
31A-23-308 or common law vicarious liability for Avis & Archibald's negligence. In 
2
 The evidence below was that Lawyers Title is a title insurer only, and that it 
does not issue professional liability policies to anyone in the State of Utah, including Avis 
& Archibald. (R268-69; 284). 
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making this argument to this Court, Big Sky has not set forth the pleading requirements 
for either cause of action. And other than urging that such causes of action can be 
reasonably inferred from the language, Big Sky has never stated, here or below, how its 
Amended Complaint adequately met those requirements. As such this Court should 
decline to address the issue altogether. See, Kuhre v. Goodfellow, 2003 UT App. 85, ^ 
13-16, 69 P.2d 286, 290 (Utah App. 2003) (declining to address whether trial court erred 
in dismissing claims when pleader failed to set forth pleading requirements and failed to 
state how their second amended complaint adequately met those requirements). 
If this Court does reach the issue, Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
governs Utah's pleading requirements. The rule requires, inter alia, that a complaint 
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a). Longstanding Utah case law has interpreted Rule 8 to 
require that the complainant "give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim." Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 160, 280 P.2d 453, 455 
(1955). Because the trial court granted Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied Big Sky's Cross-motion for Summary Judgment, this Court reviews the 
district court's determination for correctness. See Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 
2003UT8,1f20,70P.3dl. 
Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382, 386 (Utah 1962), is illustrative of the fair notice 
concept. There, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a complaint that had 
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asserted that a title insurance contract had been breached, stating that "the particular 
provision or provisions claimed to have been breached are not set out in the complaint. 
This claim does not meet the requirements of our rules and was properly dismissed." Id. 
Here, the Amended Complaint is devoid of any mention of or reference to any 
statutory liability on Lawyers Title's part, much less any specific mention to Section 31A-
23-308. Nor is there a single factual assertion that would support any liability under 
Section 31A-23-308. There is no allegation that Avis & Archibald was Lawyers Title's 
agent - the only relationship between Lawyers Title and Avis & Archibald that is alleged 
in the Amended Complaint is in paragraph 46 and the prayer for relief- there, Big Sky 
averred that the relationship was one of insurer and insured, i.e., that Lawyers Title 
should pay the damages that Big Sky incurred pursuant to any insurance policy that it may 
have issued to Avis & Archibald. (R176, par. 46; 181-82, par. 3). And the only mention 
of insurance in the Amended Complaint in reference to Lawyers Title was that Avis & 
Archibald allegedly was the "insured" under a liability policy that Lawyers Title had 
presumably issued. (Rl 81-82). 
Big Sky wanted the trial court to do more than "fill in the blanks," as was allowed 
in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1963). Big Sky wanted the 
trial court to charge Lawyers Title, because it is an insurance company, with any cause of 
action that Big Sky might possibly have that could be related to any kind of insurance in 
which Lawyers Title might be involved. While pleadings should be liberally construed, a 
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litigant cannot be charged with notice of any claim that might be brought against it based 
upon the nature of its business. Lawyers Title never had "fair notice of the nature and 
basis or grounds" for a claim under Section 31A-23-308 or under any agency theory. 
Blackham, 280 P.2d at 455. The trial court correctly found that the Amended Complaint 
did not include these causes of action. 
II. THESE CAUSES OF ACTION EXISTED IN 1997, WHEN BIG SKY 
COMMENCED THIS LITIGATION. 
"A cause of action accrues when 'it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when 
the claim is in such condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim 
is established.'" Dept of Natural Resources v. Huntington-Cleveland Irr. Co., 2002 UT at 
1J24, 52 P.3d at 1264 (citation omitted), cited by Big Sky at p. 19 of its Brief. Big Sky's 
statutory and vicarious liability causes of action existed in 1997, when this action was 
commenced. 
STATUTORY CLAIM. Under Section 31 A-23-308, a title insurer is "directly and 
primarily liable" for the disbursement of funds held in escrow by its agent who has issued 
the title insurer's commitment or a policy of insurance in connection with the transaction. 
Big Sky's own pleadings demonstrate that every element necessary for proof of Lawyers 
Title's alleged liability under this statute existed in 1997. In its original Complaint, Big 
Sky alleged that Avis & Archibald had negligently disbursed funds held in escrow. 
(R001-006) Big Sky alleged that it had been damaged by Avis & Archibald's negligent 
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disbursement of $396,000.00 of escrow funds. (R001-006) Big Sky asked for punitive 
damages in the amount of $500,000.00, and alleged that it had incurred damages in the 
form of attorney fees due to Avis & Archibald's negligent disbursement of the funds. 
(R001-006). The commitment for title insurance which Big Sky alleges was issued in 
connection with the transaction has an effective date of November 1996. (R345). Big 
Sky repeatedly argued to the trial court that pursuant to the statute, Lawyers Title was 
"strictly liable" for Avis & Archibald's mishandling of the escrow funds. (R425; R720 
pp.5-6). In its memoranda submitted in support of its summary judgment motion on this 
(unpleaded) claim, Big Sky set out these very elements, never once mentioning the date in 
2002 that it claims its damages were fixed. (R3 34-342). Thus, Big Sky itself recognizes 
that the 2002 date is simply not an element of liability under the statute. 
In sum, "all of the elements of [Section 31A-23-308] creating liability existfed] or 
may [have] be[en] established" in November 1997. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 
2002 UT 75 at U 24. 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY. Any vicarious liability claim that Big Sky may have 
had against Lawyers Title also existed in November 1997. Lawyers Title would be 
vicariously liable for Avis & Archibald's wrongful disbursement of escrowed funds only 
there was an actual or apparent agency relationship between them with respect to Avis & 
Archibald's escrow activities. Bodell Const. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 945 P.2d 
119, 124-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). That relationship would have had to have existed at 
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the time that Avis & Archibald negligently disbursed the $396,000.00 held by it in 
escrow. See Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996) (no 
vicarious liability can exist if the agent was not acting within the scope of his agency at 
the time the tort occurred). Thus, all of the elements necessary to allege vicarious 
liability existed at the time Avis & Archibald negligently disbursed the funds, and Big 
Sky could have brought a claim against Lawyers Title for vicarious liability at the same 
time it sued Avis & Archibald in 1997. 
Big Sky's argument that it did not have claims against Lawyers Title until its 
damages were certain relies on events that occurred after the original complaint was filed. 
As Big Sky notes, Wayne Ogden paid part of the funds back after Big Sky filed its 
original complaint, and then Big Sky was required to repay those funds to Ogden's 
bankruptcy trustee. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6). As a result of these events, Big Sky was not 
made whole. But at the time the original complaint was filed, its damage was in "such 
condition that the court[ could] proceed and give judgment if the claim is established.'" 
Huntington-ClevelandIrr. Co., 2002 UT 75 at TJ24; 52 P.3d at 1264. Even Big Sky's 
counsel recognized at the motion hearing, "The facts are consistent. The facts have 
always been the same right from the start. Jayson Cherry and Avis & Archibald 
mishandled escrow funds." (R720, p.6) Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined 
that Big Sky's allegations of vicarious and statutory liability against Lawyers Title 
existed at the inception of this litigation in 1997. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT HAD SEVERAL INDEPENDENT BASES ON 
WHICH EXERCISED ITS BROAD DISCRETION TO DENY BIG SKY'S 
UNTIMELY MOTION TO AMEND. 
Its Amended Complaint failing to include claims against Lawyers Title for 
vicarious or statutory liability, Big Sky argues that the trial court erroneously denied leave 
to amend to include those claims. A litigant may ask for leave to amend his pleading 
pursuant to Rule 15(a). See Utah R.Civ.P. 15 "The granting or denial of leave to amend 
a pleading is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and [appellate courts] will not 
disturb absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.'" Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 
2004 UT App 44,T{ 41, 87 P.3d 734 (quoting Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions, 2003 
UT 57,H 31, 84 P.3d 1154). This Court has explained that "[t]rial courts are in a much 
better position than appellate courts to make such case-specific determinations as whether 
too much time has passed to fairly allow an amendment, whether a party's delay is the 
result of an unfair tactic or dilatory motive, or whether some other unforeseen factor 
militates for or against a particular result in that particular case." Id. 
In analyzing a motion to amend, this Court has stated that a trial court is "well-
advised" to consider the following three well-established factors in determining whether 
to grant or deny a motion to amend: Timeliness, justification, and prejudice. Id. at f^ 39. 
Further, the "circumstances of a particular case may be such that a court's ruling on a 
motion to amend can be predicated on only one or two of the particular factors." Id. at f 
42 (citing First City Bank, N.A. v. Air Capitol Aircraft Sales, Inc., 820 F.2d 1127, 1133 
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(10th Cir. 1987) ("We hold that a district court acts within its discretion when it denies 
leave to amend for 'untimeliness' or 'undue delay.' Prejudice to the opposing party need 
not be shown also")). Here, the trial court denied Big Sky's motion to amend on each of 
these three bases. (R575).3 
In its ruling on the timeliness factor, the trial court stated: 
Timeliness: The Court concludes that Big Sky's Motion to Amend is 
untimely. Big Sky had a potential statutory cause of action against LTIC 
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 
3 lA-23a-407, from the onset of the present litigation. However, Big Sky 
elected not to assert that statutory claim until LTIC moved for summary 
judgment to dismiss the sole claim asserted against it, nearly seven years 
after filing its initial Complaint. Big Sky's request for leave to amend is 
untimely. 
(R 575)(Appendix A). Big Sky's motion to amend had come at the eleventh hour, some 
seven years into the case, fifteen (15) months after Lawyers Title had been dragged in, 
seven months after the default discovery termination date required by Rule 26(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and after completion of briefing on Lawyers Title's 
3
 Big Sky incorrectly asserts on pp. 24-25 of its Brief that the trial court relied on 
Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 895 (Utah 2002) to deny the Motion for 
Leave to Amend. Lawyers Title had cited to Holmes in support of its own summary 
judgment motion, noting that a litigant cannot oppose summary judgment by raising 
previously unpleaded claims or theories for recovery. (R271). Big Sky's unpleaded 
theories that it sought to bring through its subsequent Motion to Amend did not state 
claims that would affect the fraud claim that the trial court dismissed on summary 
judgment. The trial court properly ignored those unpleaded theories pursuant to Holmes 
in granting Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the fraud 
claim. Big Sky has not argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously dismissed the 
fraud claim. Holmes is of no consequence on appeal because the trial court did not rely 
on it to deny the Motion to Amend. 
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motion for summary judgment requesting the trial court to dismiss Big Sky's frivolous 
claim. 
When analyzing the timeliness factor, this Court has indicated that "regardless of 
the procedural posture of the case, motions to amend have typically been deemed untimely 
when they were filed several years into the litigation" Kelly, 2004 UT App at ^ 30 
(emphasis added) {citing, among others, Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 854 P.2d 1025, 
1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (upholding denial of motion to amend where the motion was 
filed three years after the commencement of the suit and eight years after the original 
injury); Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(upholding denial of motion to amend where the motion was filed six years after filing of 
the original suit)). "In such cases, the ongoing passage of time makes it increasingly 
difficult for the nonmoving party to effectively respond to the new allegations or claims. 
Parties in such circumstances are often hindered by witnesses who have since moved or 
died, by their shaky memories and recollections, or by documents which have since been 
lost or destroyed." Kelly, 2004 UT App at ^ 30. 
The timeliness factor weighs into the prejudice factor, which the trial court here 
also recognized: 
Prejudice: The Court concludes that were it to grant Big Sky's 
Motion to Amend, doing so would unduly prejudice LTIC, because Big 
Sky's potential Section [31A-23-308] claim would be barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations allowing Big Sky to bring a legally futile 
claim; LTIC would have to prepare a defense to new claims being asserted 
at this time; although the events leading to these new causes of action 
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occurred nearly seven years ago; and LTIC will likely have difficulty 
locating witnesses and documents. 
(R 575) (Appendix A).4 In the case at bar, regardless of whether the statute of limitations 
had run (see arguments, infra at Points IV and V), the difficulty in locating witnesses and 
documents seven years after the transaction and long after Avis & Archibald had ceased 
doing business - that difficulty alone justifies the trial court's refusal to grant Big Sky 
leave to amend its complaint. Kelly, 2002 UT App. 44 at [^42. 
The trial court also found that Big Sky had failed to justify its delay in bringing the 
claims. 
Justification for Delay: The Court acknowledges that Big Sky was 
involved in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding related to the present 
matter; however, Big Sky's involvement in that proceeding does not 
provide adequate justification for Big Sky's delay in seeking leave to amend 
its Amended Complaint. As stated above, Big Sky had a potential statutory 
cause of action well before it filed the present Motion to Amend. 
The Court concludes that Big Sky has failed to show justification for 
its untimely Motion. 
(R575) (Appendix A).5 In addressing the justification prong, this Court has indicated that 
the "analytic thrust" should be the reasons offered by the moving party for not including 
the facts or allegations in the original complaint. Kelly, 2002 UT App. 44 at <|f 38. 
"Forexample, in cases where the party knew of the events or claims earlier yet failed to 
4
 This finding directly contradicts Big Sky's claim on p. 27 of its Brief that the 
trial court had made no finding that the ongoing passage of time would make it difficult 
for Lawyers Title to effectively respond to any new claims brought against it. 
5
 This finding directly contradicts the argument at pps. 27-28 of Big Sky's Brief 
that the trial court did not find that Big Sky's delay was unjustified. 
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plead them due to a dilatory motive, bad faith effort during the pleading process, or 
unreasonable neglect in terms of pleading preparation, it would follow that the motion to 
amend could be denied on that basis." Id. In the instant case, where all of the elements 
for bringing the alleged claims against Lawyers Title existed in 1997, the bankruptcy 
proceeding did not prevent Big Sky from seeking to amend its complaint long before 
2002. Big Sky told the trial court that had the bankruptcy proceedings gone differently, 
and Big Sky been able to retain the funds, it still would have asserted damages against 
Lawyers Title. 
[T]he Plaintiff had hoped that the appeal [to the Tenth Circuit] would be 
successful thereby significantly reducing any potential claim which Plaintiff 
may have against Avis & Archibald or its insurance companies. 
(R426). See, also R720, p.5 ("Could be that Big Sky would come back and say, all we 
have here's defense costs perhaps"). Yet the only excuse Big Sky ever offered for the 
lengthy delay was the bankruptcy proceeding. As the trial court noted, "I have the sense 
that everybody thought this was gonna be handled, and then when Avis & Archibald went 
out of business and filed bankruptcy, [Big Sky] had to scramble to find where the deep 
pockets might be. . . ." (R720, pp. 23-24). The trial court acted well within its discretion 
in finding that Big Sky had failed to proffer an adequate justification for its delay. This 
finding is also sufficient on its own to uphold the trial court's denial of Big Sky's Motion 
to Amend. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO 
AMEND BECAUSE BIG SKY'S CLAIMS FOR VICARIOUS AND 
STATUTORY LIABILITY ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
Each of the trial court's findings on the three factors analyzed above is alone 
sufficient without further analysis to uphold its denial of Big Sky's motion to amend. 
Nevertheless, the trial court also addressed another factor, i.e., that Big Sky's attempts to 
assert its new allegations against Lawyers Title were futile. Trial courts properly deny 
motions to amend "when the moving party seeks to assert a legally insufficient or futile 
claim." Andalex Res., Inc. v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). When 
a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, then there is no point to 
amending a complaint to include it. The effort is futile. See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 
2003 UT 51, H139, 82 P.3d 1076 (court may deny motion to amend as futile if proposed 
amendment would not withstand a motion to dismiss). 
Analyzing this factor, the trial court correctly concluded that Big Sky had a 
potential claims against Lawyers Title from the "get-go." (R720 p.23) The trial court also 
correctly concluded that Big Sky's potential claim under Section 31A-23-308 was a 
"statutory remedy," unlike "suing the owner of [a] car and deciding whether or not to 
name the insurance company or not. "From the get-go, [Big Sky] had a statutory cause 
of action . . . against the insurance companies and they could have been sued directly at 
any time right out of the chute because that statute exists." (R720 p. 23 (emphasis 
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added)) In sum, the trial court correctly concluded, as reflected in its Order (R572-76) 
and the hearing transcript (R720), that Big Sky had these same potential causes of action 
against Lawyers Title in 1997. See, also, Point II supra. 
Big Sky's statutory claim is governed by the three-year statute of limitations found 
in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-26(4) ("[a]n action may be brought within three years: . 
. . (4) for a liability by the statutes of this State"). (R393). Its common law claim is 
governed by the four-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-
25(3). Accordingly, both of the claims that Big Sky sought to assert against Lawyers 
Title were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 
V. BIG SKY CANNOT SAVE ITS CLAIMS BY ARGUING THAT THEY 
SHOULD HAVE RELATED BACK. 
A. BIG SKY DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ARGUMENT BELOW. 
Big Sky seeks to avoid the statute of limitations by claiming that Rule 15(c) would 
allow its proposed claims against Lawyers Title to relate back to the filing of the 1997 
Complaint against Avis & Archibald. Big Sky protests that its "relation back arguments 
were ignored" by the trial court. (Appellant's Brief, p. 20). Big Sky's "arguments" to the 
trial court on this issue were comprised of a single sentence in its Reply Memorandum 
filed in support of its Motion to Amend. Big Sky simply asserted in conclusory fashion 
that "any amended cause of action relates back to the original filing." (R432) (Appendix 
D). Raised for the first time in Big Sky's reply pleadings, the issue was correctly ignored 
by the trial court. 
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It is the responsibility of the moving party to raise in its ... motion all of the 
issues on which it believes it is entitled to [prevail]. Allowing the moving 
party to raise new issues in its rebuttal materials is improper because the 
nonmoving party has no opportunity to respond. It is for this reason that, in 
the analogous area of appellate review, the rule is well settled that the court 
will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief 
State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah App. 1993). 
Moreover, Big Sky did not analyze the issue at all - it did not cite to Rule 15(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or to any other legal authority, but stated only that the 
claims should relate back. (R432). At the motion hearing, Big Sky's counsel even 
admitted that he had not taken time to brief the statute of limitations issue (R720, p. 16). 
'[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue." [citation omitted] This requirements puts 
the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for correction at 
that time in the course of the proceeding, [citation omitted] For a trial court 
to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error'(1) the issue must be 
raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and 
(3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority." [citation omitted]. Issues that are not raised at trial are 
usually deemed waived, [citation omitted]. 
483 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,1f51, 99 P.3d 801. Merely mentioning 
the issue in the pleadings is not enough. LeBaron & Assoc, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, 
Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App. 1991). Accordingly, this Court should deem Big 
Sky's argument waived. 
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B. BIG SKY'S "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" ARGUMENT HAS BEEN 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Failing to brief the issue below, Big Sky asserts for the first time on appeal that 
Avis & Archibald and Lawyers Title allegedly share an "identity of interest." This Court 
should decline to consider this argument. See Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2005 
UT 30,^ j 10, fn.2, 116 P.3d 295 (declining to address issues first raised on appeal by 
appellant). Big Sky has not argued "plain error or exceptional circumstances" in its 
opening Brief, as required by the Court to consider this new argument, further reaffirming 
that this Court should decline to address Big Sky's argument. Rule 24(a)(5)(B), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure; In re D.S., 2003 UT App 108,1f 1, 2003 WL 21290704 
(Memorandum Decision). 
C. BIG SKY CANNOT DEMONSTRATE ANY "IDENTITY OF 
INTEREST" BETWEEN AVIS & ARCHIBALD AND LAWYERS 
TITLE SUFFICIENT FOR THE CLAIMS TO HAVE RELATED 
BACK. 
Even if this Court were to reach the issue, Big Sky's relation-back argument fails. 
Big Sky cites to Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr., 2004 UT App. 354, 101 P.3d 371, 
and urges that Lawyers Title has an "identity of interest" with Avis & Archibald because 
it knew about the litigation and was unofficially involved before it was made a party. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-23. Under Utah law, however, an identity of interest does not 
exist "whenever an unnamed party happen[s] to know about the filing of a complaint." 
Penrose v. Ross, 2003 UT App 157, f 20, 71 P.3d 631. For an identity of interest to exist, 
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parties must also share the "same legal interest/' meaning the legal position and defenses 
of the two parties must be the same. Id. at^|19. 
In Gary Porter, a subcontractor had sued the general contractor, but waited until 
after the statute of limitations had run to amend the complaint to name the general 
contractor's surety. Gary Porter, 2004 UT App 354 at [^6. The trial court granted 
summary judgment to the surety on its statute of limitations defense, finding that the 
amended complaint did not relate back to the original filing. See id. at f 8. This Court 
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to make a determination as to whether 
the surety had had notice of the original complaint. See id. at ^45. There was no need in 
Gary Porter to discuss or analyze whether the general contractor and the surety shared the 
same legal interest, because under Utah law, a principal and surety share an identity of 
interest in the indemnity context. Penrose, 2003 UT App 157 at [^16, fn.4 {citing James 
Constr., Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). Disposi-
tion of the claim against one would dispose of the claim against the other. 
In contrast, in Penrose, the parties' interests were not the same. There, a son was 
involved in an accident while driving his father's car. See Penrose, 2003 UT App. 157 at 
fflf 2-4. Days before the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff sued the father for 
negligence, alleging that the father was driving the car. See id. at ^ 2. After the statute of 
limitations had run, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming the son as the driver, 
and alleging a claim for negligence against him. See id. at f^ 3. Both father and son 
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moved for summary judgment. The son argued the statute of limitations had run on the 
negligence claim asserted against him. See id. at [^ 5. The trial court granted both 
motions, and found that no "identity of interest" existed between the father and son to 
relate the claim against the son back to the timely filed complaint against the father. See 
id. at T[ 6. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that an identity of interest exists when "the real 
party is alerted to the proceedings so as to avoid prejudice." See id. at j^ 10. The plaintiff 
urged that it 
was reasonable to assume that father told [son] he was served with a 
complaint asserting damages resulting from the accident involving [son] 
because (1) father was served at the same residence as [son], (2) father 
knew [son] was driving his car and was in an accident, (3) father knew he 
was not the driver involved in the accident, (4) [son] was insured by father's 
insurance policy, and (5) father and [son] had the same attorney. 
Id. at Tf 10. The plaintiff argued that because son had notice of the lawsuit, he would not 
be prejudiced by being brought in as a defendant after the statute of limitations had run on 
the negligence claim. 
This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling finding no identity of interest, explain-
ing that mere knowledge of a complaint being filed was not enough to establish an 
identity of interest for relation back purposes. See id. at ffl[ 1, 20. The new and old party 
must have the same legal interest in the case. See id. at f^ 19. 
[H]ad Penrose's Original Complaint properly named the parties, a 
disposition of the case against Father would not affect a determination as to 
Ross [son] because the two parties do not have the same legal interest in the 
outcome of the case. Father's defense is that he was not negligent or liable 
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because he was nt the driver. On the other hand, Ross's affirmative defense 
focuses on the running of the statute of limitations. Even if the claim had 
been properly filed, Ross's defense would be that he did not act negligently. 
A disposition as to either party does not affect the claims or defenses 
available to the other party. Thus, where they do not have the "same" legal 
interest, there is no identity of interest. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
The fact that the two defendants were father and son, both with knowledge of the 
complaint, was simply not enough. Further, the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument 
that a showing of no "prejudice" to the unnamed party based upon prior knowledge of the 
complaint was enough to establish an identity of interest, because, as the Court explained, 
the exception to Rule 15(c) would "swallow the rule and allow relation back whenever an 
unnamed party happened to know about the filing of a complaint." Id. at Tf 20; cf., Russell 
v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995) (focusing on the relationship between the 
parties in upholding the trial court's finding that the amendment did not relate back). 
Big Sky argues only that there is an identity of interest because Lawyers Title 
knew about the complaint against Avis & Archibald before it was made a party to the 
litigation and that Lawyers Title would not be "prejudiced" by the relation back. 
(Appellant's Brief at 22-23). Assuming arguendo that Lawyers Title did know about the 
complaint, this is not enough to meet the Penrose requirements. Similar to Penrose, 
Lawyers Title does not share the same legal interests as Avis & Archibald in the outcome 
of the litigation, and "a disposition as to either does not affect the claims or defenses 
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available to the other party." Penrose, 2003 UT App. 157 at TJ 19. Lawyers Title was not 
Avis & Archibald's errors and omissions insurance carrier, meaning it was not 
indemnifying Avis & Archibald. Therefore a judgment against Avis & Archibald was not 
necessarily a judgment against Lawyers Title. If the elements of Section 31 A-23-308 are 
proven, a title underwriter's liability is "direct and primary." Based on this language, Big 
Sky itself argued that Lawyers Title's potential liability under the statute is "strict" (R425; 
R720 pp.5-6). Under Utah law, proof of liability under a strict liability statute does not 
require a finding of negligence. See, e.g., Sharp v. Williams, 915 P.2d 495 (Utah 1996) 
(holding that it is unnecessary for injured party to allege and prove negligence under 
statute imposing strict liability on owner of dog). Any potential liability on the part of 
Lawyers Title, statutory or common law, would be dependent upon facts that had no 
relevance to Big Sky's negligence claim against Avis & Archibald. For example, Big Sky 
would be required to prove that Lawyers Title had an agency relationship sufficient to 
establish common law vicarious liability. Big Sky would have to prove that any 
commitment or policy of title insurance that was issued had in fact been issued in 
connection with the transaction whereby Big Sky was harmed. Lawyers Title's defenses 
would also include an argument that Section 31A-23-308 is unconstitutional,6 and that 
Avis & Archibald was not Lawyers Title's agent for escrow purposes. And like the son 
6
 Judge J. Dennis Frederick of the Third District Court of the State of Utah, Salt 
Lake County, recently ruled that U.C.A. Section 31 A-23-308 violates Article I, Section 
24 of the Utah Constitution. (See Appendix F hereto, p. 6) 
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in Penrose, Lawyers Title also had a statute of limitations defense that was not available 
to the original party to the complaint (father in Penrose, Avis & Archibald in the case at 
bar). See Penrose, 2003 UT App. 157 at f 19. 
Avis & Archibald had none of these defenses. Instead, its primary defense was 
that it was not negligent in releasing the escrow funds. (R016-24) Thus, "disposition of 
the case against [Lawyers Title] would not affect a determination as to [Avis & 
Archibald] because the parties do not have the same legal interest in the outcome of the 
case." Penrose, 2003 UT App 157 at [^ 19. In sum, no identity of interest exists between 
Avis & Archibald and Lawyers Title. 
Thus, the trial court correctly determined that Big Sky's potential claims under 
Section 31A-23-308 and under common law agency principles were time-barred and 
patently untimely. Big Sky cursory's relation-back arguments fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Lawyers Title respectfully requests that the Court affirm 
the decisions of the trial court that denied Big Sky's Motion to Amend and granted 
Lawyers Title's Motion for Summary Judgment. Additionally, Lawyers Title respectfully 
requests that this Court rule upon Lawyers Title's claim for attorneys fees and costs on 
appeal, which issue the Court deferred in its Order on Lawyers Title's Motion for 
Summary Disposition. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BIG SKY FINANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AVIS AND ARCHIBALD TITLE 
INSURANCE AGENCY, limited company, 
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, a Virginia corporation 
doing business in the State of Utah, 
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a California corporation doing 
business in the State of Utah, TITLE PAC, 
INC., an Oklahoma company doing business 
in the State of Utah, JAYSON CHERRY, 
WILLIAM A. AVIS, and ROBIN 
ARCHIBALD, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Order(LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment is Grantee 
VD11720401 
970907313 LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPOR 
Civil No. 970907313 
Judge W. Brent West 
On April 21, 2004, at the hour of 2:00 p.m., this Court heard oral argument on the 
following Motions: Defendant Lawyers Title Insurance Company's ("LTIC") Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Plaintiff Big Sky Finance Company's ("Big Sky") Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance; and Motion to Amend Big Sky's 
rr **? o 
Amended Complaint. Plaintiff having appeared by and through its counsel Douglas M. Durbano, 
of the Durbano Law Firm, Defendant LTIC having appeared by and through its counsel Richard 
A. Rappaport and Edward T. Vasquez of COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C., and Paul M. 
Belnap appeared for Defendant Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. The Court having reviewed 
the pleadings, supporting materials, and having heard oral argument on the aforementioned 
Motions, has determined that Big Sky's Amended Complaint asserts a single cause of action 
against LTIC, that being a claim for fraudulent non-disclosure. Big Sky's Amended Complaint 
does not mention or assert any claim against LTIC under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, 
renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23a-407 (2004), nor does Big Sky's Amended Complaint 
mention or assert a claim against LTIC under any agency theory, specifically, that Avis and 
Archibald was LTIC's agent for escrow purposes. 
Big Sky's Amended Complaint alleges that LTIC fraudulently failed to disclose the 
existence of Defendant Avis and Archibald's professional liability policy ("E&O Policy"). It is 
not disputed that LTIC has provided Big Sky with all of the information that Big Sky requested 
concerning Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy. The Court has also determined that LTIC had no 
duty to disclose to Big Sky the existence of Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy. Therefore, based 
upon the foregoing, the Court issues the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
LTIC'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The undisputed facts show that LTIC made no attempt to secret away or 
fraudulently conceal information concerning the existence of Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy. 
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2. LTIC had no duty to disclose to Big Sky the existence of Avis and Archibald's 
E&O Policy. 
3. Big Sky's fraudulent nondisclosure claim against LTIC fails as a matter of law, 
and the Court therefore grants LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing with prejudice 
Big Sky's sole claim against LTIC. 
BIG SKY'S RULE 56ffl MOTION 
1. The Court finds that Big Sky's Affidavit in support of its Rule 56(f) Motion is 
insufficient to sustain Big Sky's Motion for the following reasons: 
a. Big Sky's Affidavit lacks foundation and specificity as to what 
information it seeks with respect to its claims against LTIC in the Amended Complaint; and 
b. Big Sky has failed to identify with any specificity what "policies of 
insurance" it alleges existed and whether LTIC was a party to these alleged policies. 
2. Having granted LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that LTIC had 
no duty to disclose to Big Sky the existence of Avis and Archibald's E&O Policy, that LTIC 
responded to all inquiries for information from Big Sky concerning that E&O Policy, and that 
Big Sky's Rule 56(f) Affidavit is insufficient, the Court hereby denies Big Sky's Motion for Rule 
56(f) Continuance. Additional discovery in this matter is not warranted and Big Sky's Motion is 
denied. 
BIG SKY'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. The court finds that Big Sky moved for summary judgment on claims under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-23-308, renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23a-407, and under an agency 
theory, that it failed to plead in its Amended Complaint. 
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2. Having found that Big Sky has failed to assert these claims against LTIC in its 
Amended Complaint, the Court hereby denies Big Sky's cross motion for summary judgment. 
BIG SKY'S MOTION TO AMEND ITS AMENDED COMPLAINT 
1. Having reviewed the requisite three factors for determining the merits of Big 
Sky's Motion to Amend, specifically, Big Sky's timeliness in bringing its Motion; Big Sky's 
justification for delay: and any resulting prejudice to LTIC if the Court should grant Big Sky's 
Motion, the Court issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
a. Timeliness: The Court concludes that Big Sky's Motion to Amend is 
untimely. Big Sky had a potential statutory cause of action against LTIC under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-23-308, renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23a-407, from the onset of the present 
litigation. However, Big Sky elected not to assert that statutory claim until LTIC moved for 
summary judgment to dismiss the sole claim asserted against it, nearly seven years after filing its 
initial Complaint. Big Sky's request for leave to amend is untimely. 
b. Justification for Delay: The Court acknowledges that Big Sky was 
involved in an adversary bankruptcy proceeding related to the present matter; however, Big Sky's 
involvement in that proceeding does not provide adequate justification for Big Sky's delay in 
seeking leave to amend its Amended Complaint. As stated above, Big Sky had a potential 
statutory cause of action well before it filed the present Motion to Amend. 
The Court concludes that Big Sky has failed to show justification for its untimely 
Motion. 
c. Prejudice: The Court concludes that were it to grant Big Sky's Motion to 
Amend, doing so would unduly prejudice LTIC, because Big Sky's potential Section 31 A-23a-
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407 claim would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations allowing Big Sky to bring a 
legally futile claim; LTIC would have to prepare a defense to new claims being asserted at this 
time; although the events leading to these new causes of action occurred nearly seven years ago; 
and LTIC will likely have difficulty locating witnesses and documents. 
For these reasons the Court concludes that LTIC would be unduly prejudiced were 
this Court to grant Big Sky's Motion to Amend. 
2. The Court having made the aforementioned Conclusions of Law, hereby denies 
Big Sky's Motion to Amend. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. LTIC's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted in its entirety; 
2. Big Sky's Rule 56(f) Motion for a Continuance is Denied; 
3. Big Sky's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied; 
4. Big Sky's Motion to Amend is Denied; and 
*:**->^Sk^>.^»S 
5. LTIC is dismissed as a Defendant in this matter. 
DATED this J L _ day of P * ^ 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
k 
The Honorable W. Brent West 
Second Judicial District Court 
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Douglas M. Durbano (#4209) 
DURBANO LAW FIRM 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
476 W. Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: 801-776-4111 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
BIG SKY FINANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AVIS AND ARCHIBALD TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY, limited company, LAWYERS TITLE 
INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia 
corporation doing business in the State of Utah, 
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation doing business in the State 
of Utah, TITLE PAC, INC., an Oklahoma company : 
business in the STATE OF UTAH, JAYSON 
CHERRY, WILLIAM A. AVIS, and ROBIN 
ARCHIBALD, 
Defendants. 
': ~
 A P R 2 - 2M 
: AMENDED COMPLAINT 
. Civil No. 970907313 
. Judge W. Brent West 
Plaintiff, through counsel undersigned for its cause of action against Defendants complains 
and alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Weber County, 
State of Utah. 
2. Defendant Avis and Archibald Title Insurance Agency, limited company ("Avis and 
Archibald") is a limited company doing business in Weber County, State of Utah. 
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3. Defendant Jayson Cherry is an escrow agent doing business in Weber County, State 
of Utah. 
4. Robin Archibald and William A. Avis are the principals in the Avis and Archibald 
Title Insurance Agency and both reside in Weber County, State of Utah. 
5. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") is a Virginia company doing 
business in Weber County, State of Utah. 
6. TitlePac, Inc. ("TitlePac"), is an Oklahoma company doing business in Weber 
County, State of Utah. 
7. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company ("Fireman's Fund") is a California corporation 
doing business in Weber County, State of Utah. 
8. That on February 26,1997, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendants Avis and Archibald 
with specific escrow terms for a loan to Wayne Ogden for the sole purpose of purchasing real 
property on Midland Drive in Roy City, Weber County, State of Utah. 
9. On or about March .10,1997, Plaintiffs delivered to Jayson Cherry, an employee of 
Defendant Avis and Archibald $396,000.00 to be held in escrow with Defendants Avis and 
Archibald. 
10. That said funds were not to be disbursed except pursuant to specific written 
instructions from Plaintiff. 
11. That contrary to the written instructions from Plaintiff, Defendants Avis and 
Archibald and Jayson Cherry disbursed the funds to Wayne Ogden by issuing check number 5428 
in the amount of $396,000.00. 
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12. Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry were instructed by Plaintiff and 
Wayne Ogden that Plaintiffs $396,000.00 was to be repaid with a $600,000.00 payment to be 
secured by a trust deed recorded against the Midland Drive property. 
13. Upon information and belief Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry as 
escrow agent and fiduciary to Plaintiff disbursed the escrow funds for purposes other than 
purchasing the Midland Drive property. 
14. Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry disbursed such funds without 
recording a trust deed for the benefit of Plaintiff and without disclosing the disbursement to Plaintiff. 
15. Plaintiff has attempted to file a claim under Avis and Archibald's professional 
liability policy but has been unable to get the policy or policy number from the Defendant insurance 
companies. 
16. Defendant Avis and Archibald had a professional liability policy from Defendant 
Fireman's Fund as evidenced by a copy of a check from Defendant Fireman's Fund to Defendant 
Avis and Archibald for $132,545.49 for a claim made during the same period as Plaintiffs claim 
(See Exhibit "B"). 
17. Plaintiff was informed by Interstate Insurance Group, the adjuster for Defendant 
Fireman's Fund, that Defendant Fireman's Fund disclaimed coverage to Avis and Archibald on 
Plaintiffs claim (See Exhibit "C"). 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
18. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove 
as though specifically set forth herein. 
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19. As escrow agent of Plaintiff, Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry had 
a duty to strictly comply with all escrow instructions to Plaintiff and to not distribute the funds 
except by specific instruction. 
20. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry failed to 
exercise ordinary skill care in their duty to follow escrow instructions and have negligently breached 
such duty. 
21. Plaintiff has been damaged by Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's 
negligent breach of duty to follow escrow instructions in an amount to be established upon proof at 
the time of trial. 
22. As a result of Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's negligent failure 
to follow escrow instructions, Plaintiff has been required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law 
Firm in bringing this action and incurred reasonable attorney's fees herein for which it seeks 
compensation. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
23. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove 
as though specifically set forth herein. 
24. As escrow agent of Plaintiff, Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry had 
a duty to disclose to Plaintiff any defects or failures in the transaction which were known or should 
have been known by the agent. 
25. Upon information and belief Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Avis and Archibald and 
Jayson Cherry knew or should have known that the escrow funds were not used for the purposes 
intended by Plaintiff and that there were various other irregularities in the transaction which could 
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and did cause damage to the Plaintiff and that despite these irregularities Defendants Avis and 
Archibald and Jayson Cherry failed to disclose any information to Plaintiff voluntarily. 
26. Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry failed to exercise ordinary skill 
and care in fulfilling their duty and therefore breached their duty to disclose information regarding 
irregularities in the transaction for which Plaintiff escrowed the funds which failure to timely 
disclose caused Plaintiff to lack sufficient information to protect its interest. 
27. Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's negligent failure to disclose has 
damaged Plaintiff in an amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial. 
28. As a result of Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's negligent failure 
to disclosure, Plaintiff has been required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law Firm and in 
bringing this action has incurred reasonable attorney's fees herein for which it seeks compensation. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
29. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove 
as though specifically set forth herein. 
30. As escrow agent of Plaintiff, Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry have 
a duty to record any trust deed or other security instrument which protects Plaintiff s security interest 
in real property which is the subject of the transaction. 
31. That in fact the specific instructions provided by Plaintiff require that a deed of trust 
with assignment of rents be recorded in a first lien position and guaranteed an insured by Lawyer's 
Title as a deed of trust to secure the $600,000 Promissory Note. 
32. Upon information and belief, Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry 
failed to record any Trust Deed on behalf of Plaintiff on the Midland Drive property prior to the 
disbursement of escrow funds contrary to the specific escrow instructions. 
-5-
178 
33. Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry failed to exercise ordinary skill 
and care in obtaining the recording of the anticipated trust deed which secured Plaintiffs interests 
and therefore have negligently breached their duty of care which breach has damaged Plaintiff in an 
amount to be established upon proof at the time of trial. 
34. As a result of Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's negligent failure 
to follow escrow instruction, Plaintiff has been required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law 
Firm in bringing this action and incurred reasonable attorney's fees for which it seeks compensation. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
35. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove 
as though specifically set forth herein. 
36. Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's actions as alleged in each of the 
above causes of action constitute a reckless indifference to Plaintiffs interests which are the very 
interests that Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry are duty bound to protect as escrow 
agent and fiduciary of Plaintiff. Given the agency relationship between the parties and the fact that 
Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry are in the business of acting as escrow agents, 
Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry's conduct toward Plaintiff is egregious and 
outrageous and provides a strong basis for punitive and exemplary damages against Defendants Avis 
and Archibald and Jayson Cherry equal to or exceeding $500,000.00. 
37. As a result of such outrageous conduct and reckless indifference of Defendants Avis 
and Archibald and Jayson Cherry, Plaintiff has been required to retain the services of the Durbano 
Law Firm and in bringing this action has incurred reasonable attorney's fees herein for which it 
seeks compensation. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
38. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove 
as though specifically set forth herein. 
39. Defendant Avis and Archibald holds itself out to the public as a professional title 
insurance agency, competent in the area of providing title services for property transactions. 
40. When Plaintiff utilized the services of Defendant Avis and Archibald based upon 
Defendant Avis and Archibald's above-stated representation, Defendant Avis and Archibald had a 
duty to provide title services that fell within the standard of care for the applicable title industry. 
41. By permitting money to be transferred out of escrow in contradiction to Plaintiffs 
written escrow instructions, and failing to properly maintain policies and train employees and agents 
regarding the requirement to follow written escrow instructions, Defendant Avis and Archibald 
breached its duty of care to Plaintiff to safeguard Plaintiffs money in accordance with Plaintiffs 
escrow instructions and industry standards, and such negligence has damaged Plaintiff in an amount 
to be established upon proof at the time of trial. 
42. As a proximate result of Defendant Avis and Archibald's errors, Plaintiff has been 
required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law Firm and in bringing this action has incurred 
reasonable attorney's fees for which it seeks compensation. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
43. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove 
as though specifically set forth herein. 
44. Defendants Lawyers Title and Fireman's Fund knew that Defendant Firemen's 
Fund's agent, Defendant TitlePac, had issued a professional liability insurance policy to Defendant 
Avis and Archibald that was in force at the time of Plaintiff s claim. 
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45. Defendants Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund, and TitlePac have fraudulently attempted 
to conceal from Plaintiff that a professional liability insurance policy exists for Defendant Avis and 
Archibald to cover Plaintiffs claim, which fraud has damaged Plaintiff in an amount to be 
established upon proof at the time of trial. 
46. Plaintiff is a third party beneficiary under any and all policies of insurance issued by 
Lawyers Title, Fireman's Fund and TitlePac, and that these parties are contractually liable for their 
insurance liabilities. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
47. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs hereinabove 
as though specifically set forth herein. 
48. Defendants Robin Archibald and William A. Avis knew that, although their agency 
was required by Section 31A-23-211, Utah Code Annotated, to maintain a fidelity bond or 
professional liability insurance policy in a face amount no less than $50,000 to provide protection 
against the improper performance of any service in conjunction with the issuance of a contract or 
policy of title insurance, that no such policy existed at the time that it agreed to escrow Plaintiffs 
money and follow Plaintiffs escrow instructions. 
49. Defendants Robin Archibald and William A. Avis knew at that if they disclosed to 
Plaintiff that the money Plaintiff was escrowing with their agency was not covered by a fidelity bond 
or professional liability insurance policy in a face amount no less than $50,000, that Plaintiff would 
have refused to escrow his money with Defendant Avis and Archibald. 
50. The failure of Defendants Robin Archibald and William A. Avis to inform Plaintiff 
that no fidelity bond or professional liability insurance policy was in place for Plaintiffs escrow 
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transaction constituted a fraud which fraud has damaged Plamtiff in an amount to be established 
upon proof at the time of trial. 
51. As a result of the fraud of Defendants Robin Archibald and William A. Avis, Plaintiff 
has been required to obtain the services of the Durbano Law Firm in bringing this action and 
incurred reasonable attorney's fees for which it seeks compensation. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For a finding that Defendants Avis and Archibald and Jayson Cherry negligently 
breached their duty of skill and care of Plaintiff in relation to the escrowed funds; 
2. For a finding that Defendants Lawyer's Title, Fireman's and TitlePac is liable for 
damages incurred by their insured and that they committed a fraud upon Plaintiff in relation to the 
denial of Plaintiff s claim for damages in relation to the escrowed funds and the unwillingness to 
produce a policy or policy number for such insurance; 
3. For an award of damages in favor of Plaintiff in an amount to be established upon 
proof at the time of trial; 
4. For punitive and exemplary damages in the amount of $500,000; 
5. For attorney's fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in bringing this action; and 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this day of December, 2001. 
Plaintiffs Address: 
476 W. Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Douglas to . Durbano 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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EXHIBIT "B" 183 
INTERSTATE 
INSURANCE 
GROUP 
AISU iri! '<?'. 
August 1,2001 
55 F.ist Monroe Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
312-346-6400 
FAX 312-346-5740 
Durvano Law Firm 
476 West I leritage Park Blvd. 
Suite 200 
Layton, UT 84041 
Attn: Douglas M. Durvano 
Re: Our Insured: 
Claim No.: 
Avis & Archibald Title Insurance 
55001001300 
Dear Mr. Durvano: 
This will acknowledge receipt of your July 10, 2001 letter with regards lo the above-captioned file. 
Please be advised that on June 6, 2001, the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company disclaimed coverage lo 
Avis & Archibald Tille Insurance on this matter. 
Sincerely, 
M J K / l r a l l 
7/27 
1.P4 
EXHIBIT "C" 
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RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given 
when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be 
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at 
any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court 
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted 
in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
TabD 
Douglas M. Durbano (#4209) 
DURBANO LAW FIRM 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
476 W. Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200 
Layton,Utah 84041 
Telephone: 801-776-4111 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
BIG SKY FINANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AVIS AND ARCHIBALD TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY, limited company, LAWYERS TITLE 
INSURANCE CORPORATION, a Virginia 
corporation doing business in the State of Utah 
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation doing business in the state 
of Utah, TITLE PAC, INC., an Oklahoma company : 
doing business in the State of Utah, JAYSON 
CHERRY, WILLIAM A. AVIS, and ROBIN 
ARCHIBALD, 
Defendants. : 
: PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO 
: DEFENDANTS'OPPOSITION 
: MEMORANDUM REGARDING 
: MOTION TO AMEND 
: Civil No. 970907313 
Judge W. Brent West 
Plaintiff, Big Sky Finance Company ("Big Sky") by and through its counsel of record hereby 
submits the following reply to Defendants' Opposition Memorandum Regarding Motion to Amend. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This controversy started when Avis and Archibald mishandled $400,000.00 which 
was placed in escrow, by releasing it to Wayne Ogden, contrary to written instructions. Ultimately 
the funds were paid back to the escrow, by way of other investors of Wayne Ogden's ponzi scheme. 
Plaintiffs reply to defendants' opposition memorandui 
rf\ V$ \ * 
• c c C ^ 
tf*\tf 
tf 
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970907313 LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPOR 
of limitations. But, this argument is circular in that it assumes Lawyer's Title as principal had no 
notice in the original or first Amended Complaint of the actions perpetrated by its agent. 
Notwithstanding that this defense is not available, the Plaintiff would have numerous legal and 
factual arguments which may defeat any statute of limitations defense, even if the Plaintiff were 
bringing this action for the first time. For example, where the Defendant secrets itself from the state, 
hides or otherwise denies that there is a policy of insurance or contractual obligation which would 
bind it, or otherwise perpetrates acts of misrepresentation or fraud, then the statute of limitations 
would not begin to run until the Plaintiff had the necessary facts to know of its cause of action. 
Also, Plaintiffs cause of action may not have fully accrued until it had suffered actual damages, 
which did not occur until the appeal was finalized, in which Big Sky was held liable to the 
Bankruptcy Trustee for a preferential transfer, which appeal was handed down in December of 2002, 
approximately one year ago. Further, any amended cause of action relates back to the original filing. 
Finally, a claim against the agent tolls the statute of limitations for the same claims against its 
principal, especially an undisclosed principal. 
Therefore, the three points enumerated in the Bronson, case have been met in this case, i.e., 
that there has been no delay, or in other words the motion is timely, and the justification for the 
delay was that the parties were waiting for the outcome of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, and 
there has not been any resulting legal prejudice to the responding party. 
Lawyer's Title also argues that the case of Bodell Constr, Co. v. Stewart Guar. Co., 954 P.2d 
119 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997) would provide a defense in this matter rendering the proposed amendment 
"Legally Insufficient and Futile" at page 10 of Response Memorandum. 
-11-
TabE 
§ 31A-23a-407 . Liability of title insurers for acts of title insurance pro-
ducers 
Any title company, represented by one or more title insurance producers, is 
directly and primarily liable to others dealing with the title insurance producers 
for the receipt and disbursement of funds deposited in escrows with the title 
insurance producers in all those transactions where a commitment or binder 
for or policy or contract of title insurance of that title insurance company has 
been ordered, or a preliminary report of the title insurance company has been 
issued or distributed. This liability does not modify, mitigate, impair, or affect 
the contractual obligations between the title insurance producers and the title 
insurance company. 
Laws 1985, c. 242, § 28; Laws 2002, c. 308, § 57, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 298, 
§ 67, eff. May 5, 2003. 
Codifications C 1953, § 31A-23-308. 
TabF 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (2033) 
Paul C. Drecksel (5946) 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: 801-532-7840 
Fax: 801-532-7750 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MILLENNIA INVESTMENT ] 
CORPORATION, -
^ ^ \^y * ^-1 ^- f * ^ * fc * *. ^-^ * ^ 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs ; 
ATTORNEYS TITLE GUARANTY FUND, . 
INC . et al., . 
Defendant. 
1 ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
1 PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 000902574 CN 
) Judge: J. Dennis Frederick 
The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of plaintiff Millennia Investment Corporation, 
a Utah corporation ("Millennia") dated June 30, 2000 and the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment of Attorneys Title Guaranty Fund ("ATGF") dated October 17, 2000 came on regularly 
for hearing before the Court, the Honorable J Dennis Frederick presiding at 9:00 a.m. on 
February 26, 2001, Millennia appearing through its counsel, Thomas R. Karrenberg, Stephen W. 
Dougheny, and Nathan B. Wilcox, and ATGF appearing through its counsel, Paul C. Drecksel 
and Bruce A. Maak, and the Court having reviewed the file and pleadings and the materials 
FILES BISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 17 21 
By. £ 
submitted by the parties with respect to both Motions, having heard argument of counsel, being 
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ruled and ordered as follows: 
A. Millennia's Motion for Partial Summarv Judgment. Millennia's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment sought partial summary judgment adjudicating ATGFs liability for 
$433,625.00 in principal and interest thereon based upon Millennia's positions that Millennia was 
the assignee of White Properties ("White"), and White deposited $433,625.00 into an escrow 
account with Granite Title, White allegedly ordered and paid for a title policy from ATGF, and 
Granite Title misappropriated the deposited funds, as a result of which Millennia claims ATGF is 
liable to it under Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308. Millennia submitted the Affidavit of Alan 
Combs dated June 30, 2000 in support of its Motion ("Combs Affidavit"). Thereafter, Millennia 
submitted the Affidavits of Raymond Horsley dated November 8, 2000 ("Horsley Affidavit"), tile 
Affidavit of Dan Jones dated November 21, 2000 ("Jones Affidavit"), and the Affidavit of Lewis 
Livingston dated November 10, 2000 ("Livingston Affidavit"). ATGF moved to strike portions 
of the Combs and Livingston .Affidavits. The Court rules and orders as follows with respect to 
Millennia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and ATGFs Motions to Strike Portions of the 
Combs and Livingston .Affidavits: 
1. ATGFs Motion to Strike Portions of the Combs Affidavit is hereby granted. 
Paragraphs 2 through 9 of the Combs .Affidavit are inadmissible and must be stricken because 
they fail to comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(a), the affiant lacked personal 
knowledge of the matters stated therein, the statements contained therein lack foundation, the 
statements therein mischaracterize the evidence, the statements therein improperly describe the 
contents of documents in violation of the best evidence rule, and the statements therein constitute 
improper legal conclusions. 
2. Paragraphs 2 through 9 of the Combs Affidavit be and the same are hereby 
stricken. 
3. ATGFs Motion to Strike the Livingston Affidavit be and the same is hereby 
granted. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11 of the Livingston Affidavit must be stricken pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(e) and applicable law because they contain 
impermissible representations regarding legislative history, conclusory statements without 
evidentiary foundation, and inadmissible legal opinions. 
4. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 11 of the Livingston Affidavit be and the same are 
hereby stricken. 
5. The evidentiary materials submitted by ATGF give rise to multiple genuine issues 
of material fact which preclude the granting of Millennia's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Millennia failed to demonstrate by admissible evidence an entitlement to summary judgment. 
6 As set forth in greater detail below under paragraph B.2 and B.3, Utah Code Ann. 
v^ 3 1A-23-308 is unenforceable as a matter of law because it is violative of equal protection and 
due process clauses of the Utah Constitution and/or if constitutionally construed, that statute does 
not apply to the facts presented here. 
7. Attached hereto marked Exhibit 1 is a five page document alleged by Millennia to 
constitute a commitment for title insurance that fulfills the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§3 1 A-23-308. Based upon the undisputed facts, Exhibit 1 does not constitute a commitment or 
binder for or policy or contract of title insurance of ATGF or a preliminary report of ATGF 
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within the meaning of Section 31A-23-308 for each of the following independent reasons: (i) 
Exhibit 1 does not mention ATGF, Exhibit 1 on its face states that it is enforceable only if a 
cover is attached, and no cover was attached, Exhibit 1 does not contain essential elements 
required to form a commitment to issue title insurance because it contains no commitment or 
agreement to issue a policy, and does not identify a proposed insured; (ii) Exhibit 1 does not 
qualify as a binder or commitment under the governing statutes, which require that a binder or 
commitment contain a description of the subject and amount of insurance; (iii) Exhibit 1 is too 
indefinite to create an enforceable contract because it lacks essential material terms, including the 
amount of insurance to be provided, the amount of the insurance premium, and the name of the 
insured; and (iv) Exhibit 1 was not issued with respect to the transaction in connection with 
which the funds in question were misappropriated. 
8. There exist disputed issues of material fact as to whether Millennia/White ever 
orally or by letter requested or ordered a policy of title insurance of ATGF at all. Based upon the 
undisputed facts, however, there was no ordering of a commitment, binder, policy or contract of 
title insurance within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. Section 31 A-23-308 because no 
enforceable order was received by ATGF To constitute such an enforceable order, the order 
must have been written, contain all essential terms, and be accepted by ATGF, none of which 
occurred here. 
9 Based upon the undisputed facts. Millennia and White looked to Horsley (who 
was an employee of Granite Title), individually to perform for Millennia/White functions relating 
to the origination of the subject loan, to act as a loan broker, to negotiate with the borrower with 
respect to the loan, and to perform due diligence. White and Millennia also expected Horsley to 
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handle the closing of the subject loan as a Granite Title employee and in that capacity arrange for 
the issuance of a title insurance policy as the agent of a title insurance company White and 
Millennia's deposit of funds with Horsley, who was performing acts both as an employee of 
Granite Title and separately and individually for Millennia/White, is not a transaction intended to 
be covered by Utah Code Ann §31A-23-308, even assuming it were constitutional 
10. Based upon the undisputed facts, Millennia and White were aware that Horsley 
was individually accepting a substantial payment from them in connection with a transaction in 
which they expected Horsley to act as an employee of Granite Title in handling the closmg and 
arranging for the issuance of a title policy Millennia and White's causing or allowing Horsley to 
undertake duties for both Granite Title and separately for them, coupled with ATGFs ignorance 
of those matters, created a conflict of interest and breach of the duties that Horsley owed Granite 
Title and through it to ATGF ATGF is entitled to rescission of any commitment, binder, policy 
or contract of title insurance or preliminary report that was issued, assuming such issuance 
occurred in this case, which did not in fact occur 
11 Based on the undisputed facts. Horsley acted on behalf of White and Millennia in 
onmnatinu their loan, performing due diligence on their loan, and handing all contact with the 
prospective borrowers concerning the loan and closing and was individually paid a $4,000 00 fee 
upon closing by Millennia/White Those actions were not within the scope of Horsley's authority 
with Granite Title or Granite Title's authority with ATGF Horsley knew the fraudulent nature of 
the transaction in which he was acting ATGF was ignorant of the circumstances surroundmg the 
transaction Because Horsley's knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the transaction was 
integrally related to his duties for White and Millennia, that knowledge is imputed to White and 
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Millennia. Because Horsley's duties to Granite Title and to Granite Title on behalf of ATGF had 
no connection with the subject matter to which his knowledge related, his knowledge of the 
fraudulent nature of the transaction is not imputed to ATGF. 
12. For the foregoing reasons, Millennia's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be 
and it is hereby denied. 
B. ATGFs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. ATGF moved for partial 
summary judgment upon the grounds (i) that Section 31A-23-3 08 violates constitutional equal 
protection requirements, (ii) that statute violates constitutional due process requirements, and (iii) 
if that statute is enforceable and applies here, then the jury must apportion damages by 
comparing the relative fault of appropriate parties under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38. 
1. There exist no genuine issues of material fact bearing upon ATGFs Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
2 Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308 violates Article I, Section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution (which requires that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation") 
because it treats title insurers differently than other similarly situated entities without a 
reasonable basis. Title insurance agents both handle escrow closings and issue title insurance on 
behalf of title companies (which are the actual insurers). In addition to title insurance agents, 
escrow companies, lawyers, banks, mortgage brokers, and real estate agents handle funds in 
connection with real estate closings and escrows, but only closings handled by title insurance 
agents subject title companies to liability. There is no rational basis upon which strict liability 
can be imposed on title companies but not on other similarly situated principals. Although 
parties may place funds in escrow with entities other than title insurance agents, the statute 
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similes out title companies as the only entity that may be held strictly liable for the mishandling 
of such funds and only subjects them to liability as to closings handled by title insurance 
companies. 
3. Utah Code Ann. §31A-23-308 violates the due process clause of the Utah 
Constitution, Article I, Section 7 because the statute imposes liability on someone other than the 
party at fault (here, the title company) which had no knowledge of and could not be expected to 
have prevented the actionable conduct. To construe §31 A-23-308 in a constitutionally 
permissible manner requires that the statute be read to require that the title company have some 
knowledge and/or control over the fraudulent acts of the title insurance agent before liability is 
imposed. Thus, the statute must be read to require that the title company issue or distribute a 
commitment, accept an order for title insurance, or otherwise participate in the transaction before 
being held liable. Because the undisputed facts establish that ATGF had no knowledge of the 
transaction and did not issue or distribute a commitment or accept an order for title insurance, the 
statute, construed constitutionally, does not subject ATGF to liability. 
A Because of the other rulings of the Court, the Court does not address ATGFs 
argument that liability under Section 3 1 A-23-308 must be allocated in accordance with Utah's 
comparative fault statute 
5. The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of ATGF be and the same is hereby 
granted. 
6. The First Cause of Action of the Complaint herein of Millennia be and the same is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits. This Order does not address whether or not 
its various rulings affect the other causes of action contained in the Complaint. 
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Miscellaneous. The Court defers its decision on an award of costs until the Coun 
enters a final Order disposing of all of the claims of all of the parties in this action. 
MADE AND ENTERED this ( { f ^ of KU///' , 2001. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served by hand delivering a copy this cW day of 
March, 2001, addressed to: 
Thomas R Karrenberg, Esq. 
Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Kris Hennod, Secretary 
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71P.3d631 
71 P.3d 631, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2003 UT App 157 
(Cite as: 71 P.3d 631,2003 UT App 157) 
C 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nana G. PENROSE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Bryant ROSS, an individual (formerly identified as 
Doe 1); Christopher Ross, 
an individual; Does 2-5, inclusive, whose true 
names are not known to 
plaintiff, Defendants and Appellee. 
No. 20010943 CA. 
May 22, 2003. 
Motorist, days before statute of limitations was to 
expire, filed complaint alleging owner of other 
vehicle and Does 1 - 5 pulled of parking lot and 
negligently hit her vehicle. After statute of 
limitations expired motorist amended her complaint 
to identify son of vehicle's owner as the driver of 
the vehicle. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, Leon A. Dever, J., granted owner's and 
son's motions for summary judgment, and motorist 
appealed the summary judgment for owner's son. 
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) 
failure to name son in original complaint was not a 
misnomer or technical mistake, and (2) father and 
son did not have an identity of interest for purposes 
of determining whether amendment related back to 
date of original complaint despite the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Limitation of Actions €==>124 
241kl24 Most Cited Cases 
[1] Limitation of Actions €=>125 
241kl25 Most Cited Cases 
Rule allowing an amendment of a pleading to relate 
back to the date of the original pleading generally 
will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No C 
Page 1 
adds new parties for those brought before the court 
by the original pleadings, with the exception that 
relation back occurs as to both plaintiff and 
defendant, when new and old parties have an 
identity of interest, so it can be assumed or proved 
the relation back is not prejudicial. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
[2] Limitation of Actions €=>124 
241kl24 Most Cited Cases 
[2] Limitation of Actions €=>125 
241kl25 Most Cited Cases 
An "identity of interest" exists, for purposes of 
allowing an amendment to a pleading substituting or 
adding new parties to relate back to the date of the 
original pleading, despite the running of the statute 
of limitations, when the real parties in interest are 
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were 
involved in them unofficially, from an early stage. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
[3] Limitation of Actions €=>121(2) 
241kl21(2) Most Cited Cases 
In misnomer cases, the correction of a party name is 
a formal change, rather than a substantial change; 
thus, amending the complaint does not affect the 
rights of the added party, and fairly relates back to 
the original filing, despite the running of the statute 
of limitations. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15. 
[4] Limitation of Actions €=^121(2) 
241kl21(2) Most Cited Cases 
[4] Limitation of Actions €=^124 
241kl24 Most Cited Cases 
Amended negligence complaint of motorist, adding 
as a party the other vehicle's owner's son as the 
driver of the vehicle that struck her, did not relate 
back to date of original complaint identifying owner 
and Does 1-5 as being the negligent parties, on 
ground that failure to identify owner's son in 
original complaint was a misnomer or technical 
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mistake; as evidenced by accident report motorist 
was given notice at the scene that owner's son was 
the driver of the vehicle that struck her vehicle. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15. 
[5] Limitation of Actions €=^124 
241kl24 Most Cited Cases 
If an identity of interest is established between the 
party identified in the original pleading and the 
party added in the amended pleading, a party 
generally cannot be prejudiced, for purposes of 
determining whether the amended pleading relates 
back to the original pleading despite the running of 
the statute of limitations. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
15(c). 
[6] Limitation of Actions €=>124 
241kl24 Most Cited Cases 
[6] Limitation of Actions €=>125 
241kl25 Most Cited Cases 
An "identity of interest," for purposes of 
determining whether an amended pleading adding 
or substituting a party relates back to the original 
pleading despite the running of the statute of 
limitations, requires parties to have the "same" 
interest. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
[7] Limitation of Actions €^ =>124 
241kl24 Most Cited Cases 
Father and son did not have an "identity of interest" 
in negligence action of motorist for injuries she 
received in accident with car owned by father but 
driven by son, and thus amended complaint adding 
son as a party did not relate back to original 
complaint for purposes of the statute of limitations; 
though son lived with father, was insured under 
father's insurance policy and father presumably 
knew that son was driving car and in an accident, 
defense of father was that he was not negligent or 
liable because he was not the driver, defense of son 
would be that statute of limitations expired and that 
he did not act negligently, and thus a disposition as 
to either would not affect the claims or defenses 
available to the other. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(c). 
*632 Scott N. Cunningham, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant. 
Michael W. Wright and Richard K. Glauser, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges DAVIS, GREENWOOD and 
THORNE. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
**1 Nana Penrose (Penrose) appeals the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, 
Bryant Ross (Ross), claiming error in the court's 
determination that her *633 amended complaint 
does not properly relate back to the original 
complaint. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 On November 17, 2000, just days prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations on her claim, 
Penrose filed a complaint for negligence (Original 
Complaint) against Christopher Ross (Father) and 
Does 1-5. In the Original Complaint, Penrose 
alleged that she was traveling southbound on 900 
East when Father and Does 1-5 pulled out of a 
parking lot and hit her car. Penrose claimed that 
Father and Does 1-5 were negligent in: failing to 
pay attention to existing and changing traffic 
conditions; failing to look out for vehicles on the 
road, resulting in a traffic ticket; driving too fast; 
and driving and operating an automobile 
improperly. Penrose claimed damages from serious 
injuries she sustained, resulting in permanent 
impairment, mental anguish, sleeplessness, nausea, 
headaches, and dizziness. Penrose additionally 
sought damages exceeding $3,000 for various 
medical services. 
**3 On December 27, 2000, after the statute of 
limitations had run, Penrose filed an Amended 
Complaint, identifying Doe 1 as Ross, Father's son. 
Penrose's Amended Complaint names Father as the 
owner of the vehicle but alleges that the negligent 
party was Ross, who was driving the car, not Father. 
Aside from the change in the identity of the 
negligent party, all other allegations as to cause and 
injury remained the same as in the Original 
Complaint. 
> 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://print.westlawxom/delivery.html?dest=atp&fomiat=HTM 12/5/2005 
71P.3d631 
71 P.3d 631, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2003 UT App 157 
(Cite as: 71 P.3d 631,2003 UT App 157) 
**4 Father responded to the Original Complaint 
on January 2, 2001, denying significant parts. [FN1] 
Father also filed an affidavit on January 5, 2001, 
stating that although he was the owner of the 
vehicle involved in the accident, he was not the 
driver. Father included a copy of the police report 
that identified Ross as the driver of the car that 
collided with Penrose. 
FN1. Father's response to the Original 
Complaint and Penrose's Amended 
Complaint appear to have crossed in the 
mail. 
**5 Ross filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
claiming the action against him was barred by the 
statute of limitations. Father also filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, arguing that because Penrose 
had amended her complaint alleging that Ross was 
the true driver of the vehicle, he could not be liable. 
**6 The trial court granted Ross's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, determining that the statute of 
limitations had run and that no identity of interest 
existed between Father and Ross. The trial court 
also granted Father's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, concluding that a "cause of action for 
negligence may not be made out solely on the basis 
of ownership." Penrose appeals the summary 
judgment granted to Ross. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
**7 Penrose contends that the trial court erred in 
granting Ross's Motion for Summary Judgment. "In 
considering an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts in a light most 
favorable to the losing party below. And in 
determining whether those facts require, as a matter 
of law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing 
party below, we give no deference to the trial 
court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness." Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
[FN2] 
FN2. Although Penrose asserts that the 
trial court's findings of fact are inadequate, 
we believe the undisputed facts contained 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No C 
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in the court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are sufficient as a 
matter of law to support its grant of 
summary judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
**8 The traffic accident from which this suit arose 
occurred on November 21, 1996. Thus, the statute 
of limitations for Penrose's claim of negligence 
expired on November 21, 2000. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12- 25(3) (2002) ("An action may be 
brought within four years: ... for relief not 
otherwise provided for by law."); see also State 
Bank of S Utah v. Troy Hygro Sys., 894 P.2d 1270, 
1274 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (stating claims of 
negligence are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 
78-15-25(3)). On November 17, 2000, just *634 
four days before the expiration of the statute of 
limitations, Penrose filed her Original Complaint, 
asserting that Father's negligent driving resulted in 
an accident injuring Penrose. Penrose properly 
filed an Amended Complaint prior to service of 
Father's responsive pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
15(a) ("A party may amend his pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served ...."). However, the Amended 
Complaint, filed on December 27, 2000, naming 
Ross as defendant Doe 1, was filed after the statute 
of limitations expired. Therefore, the issue before 
this court is whether the Amended Complaint 
properly relates back to the Original Complaint, 
thus permitting Penrose to pursue her action against 
Ross. 
[1][2] **9 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) 
governs the relation back of amendments, stating: 
"Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to 
be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading." Id. 
Rule 15(c) further "allows a plaintiff to cure 
defects in his or her original complaint despite the 
intervening running of a statute of limitations." 
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 
1995). Generally, however, rule 15(c) 
will not apply to an amendment which substitutes 
or adds new parties for those brought before the 
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court by the original pleadings .... 
There is an exception to this rule. The exception 
operates where there is a relation back, as to both 
plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties 
have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed 
or proved the relation back is not prejudicial. 
The rationale underpinning this exception is one 
which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute of 
limitations; to prevent adjudication of a claim. 
Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 
(Utah 1976) (emphasis added); see also Vina v. 
Jefferson Ins. Co. ofN.Y., 761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988) (applying identity of interest rule laid 
out in Doxey-Layton ). "An identity of interest 
exists 'when "the real parties in interest were 
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were 
involved in them unofficially, from an early stage." ' 
" Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247,f 29, 53 P.3d 
2 (quoting Sulzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76,f 
14, 977 P.2d 497 (quoting Doxey-Layton, 548 P.2d 
at 906)), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). 
**10 Citing the above cases, Penrose argues that 
there is an "identity of interest" when the real party 
is alerted to the proceeding so as to avoid prejudice. 
Penrose reasons that it is reasonable to assume that 
Father told Ross he was served with a complaint 
asserting damages resulting from the accident 
involving Ross because (1) Father was served at the 
same residence as Ross, (2) Father knew Ross was 
driving his car and was in an accident, (3) Father 
knew he was not the driver involved in the accident, 
(4) Ross was insured by Father's insurance policy, 
and (5) Father and Ross have the same attorney. 
Therefore, Penrose argues, Ross had notice of the 
lawsuit and would not be prejudiced by being added 
as a named party in the Amended Complaint. 
**11 Ross argues that Utah courts have allowed 
the relation back of amendments to complaints 
incorporating newly named parties in two types of 
cases: (1) in so called "misnomer cases," and (2) 
where there is a true "identity of interest." We 
agree, but determine this case does not fit either. 
[3] **12 In the misnomer cases, Utah has 
permitted amendments where the complaint 
contains a technical defect in the naming or 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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identification of a party. 
"A misnomer is involved when the correct party 
was served so that the party before the Court is 
the one Plaintiff intended to sue, but the name or 
description of the party in the Complaint is 
deficient in some respect." 6A [Charles A. 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane] 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1498 (2d 
ed.1990). Furthermore, "[i]f the body of the 
complaint correctly identifies the party, or if the 
proper person has actually been served with 
process, courts generally will allow an 
amendment under Rule 15 to correct technical 
defects in the caption. *635 This seems 
appropriate inasmuch as a defective caption or 
even its complete absence is merely a formal 
error and never shall be viewed as a fatal defect." 
5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1321, at 728-30 (2d 
ed. 1990) (footnotes omitted). 
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 370 
(Utah 1996) (alteration in original). As explained 
in Otchy v. City of Elizabeth Bd. of Educ, 325 
N.J.Super. 98, 737 A.2d 1151 (App.Div.1999), in 
misnomer cases, the correction of a party name is a 
" 'formal' " change, rather than a " 'substantial' " 
change; thus, amending the complaint "does not 
affect the rights of the added party, and ... fairly 
relatefs] back to the original filing[,] despite the 
running of the statute of limitations." Id. at 1155. 
**13 For example, in Sulzen v. Williams, a woman 
was hit and killed by a rock dislodged by two 
minors hiking above her. See 1999 UT App 76 at \ 
2, 977 P.2d 497. In a suit for negligence, the named 
defendants were the mother and guardian of one of 
the minors, and the father and guardian of the other 
minor. See id. at 1f 3. However, the text of the 
complaint alleged that the minors were the negligent 
parties. See id. at f 4. The trial court granted the 
parents' motion for summary judgment and 
prohibited the plaintiffs from amending the 
complaint to name the minors as defendants 
because the statute of limitations had run and the 
parents were admittedly not negligent. See id. at % 
^ 5-9. On appeal, this court reversed, stating that 
the complaint could properly be amended because 
the parents "had an identity of interest with their 
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
inttnV/nnntwp^tlaw.com/deliverv.html?dest=atD&format=HTMLE& 12/5/2005 
71 P.3d 631 
71 P.3d 631, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 2003 UT App 157 
(Cite as: 71 F.3d 631,2003 UT App 157) 
children, and thus relating 1:I:M [plaintiffs'] 
amendment back would not have been prejudicial." 
Id. at If 15 (emphasis added). Because "the parents 
[were] incorrectly named as defendants in the 
original complaint's caption- i.e., named in the 
wrong place in the caption's phraseology," we 
reasoned that although a mistake was made in the 
naming of the parties, the minor children "were 
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, and that they 
thus had sufficient identity of interest with then-
parents, to make relation back appropriate." Id. 
(footnote omitted); see also Wilcox, 911 P.2d at 
370- 71 (permitting an amendment to a complaint 
that incorrectly named "Geneva Rock Co.," rather 
than "Geneva Rock Products, Inc.," where the 
summons correctly listed the company name and the 
vice president was properly served); 5 Wright & 
Miller, supra, § 1321 ("If the body of the complaint 
correctly identifies the party ... courts generally will 
allow an amendment under [r]ule 15 to cornx! 
technical defects in the caption."). 
[4] **14 This is not the case presented here. 
Unlike Sulzen, where the correct party was 
specifically identified in the text of the complaint as 
the negligent party, see id. 1999 UT App 76 at f 
4, 977 P.2d 497, Ross was not identified in any 
capacity in the Original Complaint. Here, there was 
no misnomer or "technical" mistake; Penrose 
purposefully sued Father for negligence and sought 
to add Ross as a defendant and the negligent party 
after the expiration of the statute of limitations. 
Furthermore, it cannot be argued that Penrose 
merely made a technical mistake in naming Father 
as the negligent driver, because, as evidenced by the 
police report, Penrose was given notice at the scene 
of the accident that Ross was the driver and Father 
was the owner of the vehicle. [FN3] 
FN3. The original police report clearly 
lists Father as owner of the vehicle, Ross 
as the driver of the vehicle, and 
specifically charges Ross with "Improper 
LookOut" 
[5] **15 Having determined that the present case 
is not a misnomer case, we next determine whether 
a true identity of interest exists, permitting the 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No C 
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amended complaint to relate back. If an identity of 
interest is established, a party generally cannot be 
prejudiced. See Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 
P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976) (stating amendment 
permitted "where there is a relation back, ... when 
new and old parties have an identity of interest; so 
it can be assumed or proved the relation back is not 
prejudicial"); Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y., 
761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (same). 
[6] **16 Black's Law Dictionary defines "identity" 
as "[t]he identical nature of two or more things." 
Black's Law Dictionary 748 (7th ed.1999). 
Webster's defines identity as *636 "sameness of 
essential or generic character in different instances" 
and "the condition of being the same with 
something described or asserted." Webster's Ninth 
New Collegiate Dictionary 597 (1986). Therefore, 
an identity of interest requires parties to have the 
"same" interest. This definition is supported by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Attorney General v. 
Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 1294 (1937). 
In Pomeroy, the issue before the court was whether 
a final judgment as to one issue in a case with 
multiple parties was effective as to all parties for the 
purpose of an appeal. [FN4] See id. at 1294. The 
court applied the "identity of interest" test, which it 
defined as "whether the determination of the issues 
as to any defendant depends on or affects the 
determination of the issues as to the other 
defendants." [FN5] Id 
FN4. Determining whether an identity of 
interest exists is necessary in numerous 
contexts. See, e.g., Doxey-Layton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah 1976) 
(finding an identity of interest between 
decedent and heirs so as to permit an 
amendment adding heirs as parties); 
Nunnelly v. First Fed. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n 
of Ogden, 107 Utah 347, 154 P.2d 620, 
626 (1944) (outlining rule to determine 
parties in a class action and requiring there 
be an identity of interest); Conder v. Hunt, 
2000 UT App 105,1[ 9, 1 P.3d 558 (noting 
that claim preclusion applies in limited 
exception for those in privity with one 
another evaluated by the parties' identity of 
toOrig.U.S. <i.m 
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interest); James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 669 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994) (stating an identity of 
interest exists between principal and surety 
in the context of indemnity). 
FN5. Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 
Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 1294 (1937), 
implemented a rule that the statute of 
limitations for debt is extended by 
acknowledgment or partial payment. This 
rule was superceded by statute, as held in 
State Bank of Southern Utah v. Troy 
Hygro Systems, 894 P.2d 1270, 1276 
(Utah Ct.App.1995). However, its analysis 
as to identity of interest was not affected. 
**17 Similarly, in Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 
247, 53 P.3d 2, this court determined that an 
identity of interest existed between an employer and 
an employee, permitting an amendment to the 
complaint adding the employer as a party to the 
complaint. In Nunez, a malpractice action was filed 
against a physician alleging damages caused by the 
physician's performance of a medical treatment. 
See id. at \ 5. Nunez filed a motion to amend the 
complaint to name the physician's employer, the 
University of Utah Hospital (Hospital), as a 
defendant. See id. at ffif 5-6. The trial court 
denied Nunez's motion and she appealed. See id. at 
1[ 6. In determining whether the amended 
complaint related back to the original complaint, 
this court analyzed rule 15(c) and cases outlining 
the exception permitting the addition of parties 
where an identity of interest is established. See id. 
at f 29. 
**18 We held that an identity of interest existed 
between the Hospital and the physician because the 
cause of action " 'arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in the original 
pleading.' " Id. (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c)). 
This court also noted that the Hospital had potential 
vicarious liability as the employer of the physician. 
See id. at fflf 27-34. Further, the University 
provided legal counsel for the physician, asserting 
that the physician was acting within the scope of his 
employment by the Hospital and was entitled to the 
protections of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
[FN6] See id. 
FN6. Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 
P.3d 2, also addressed rule 15(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring 
that amendments should be permitted 
"when justice so requires." Id. at f 19. 
That discussion appropriately focuses on 
prejudice. 
[7] **19 In Nunez, any disposition of the case 
against the physician would necessarily affect the 
Hospital's liability. Thus, an identity of interest 
existed because the legal position and defenses of 
the two parties were the "same." However, in the 
present case, had Penrose's Original Complaint 
properly named the parties, a disposition of the case 
against Father would not affect a determination as 
to Ross because the two parties do not have the 
same legal interest in the outcome of the case. 
Father's defense is that he was not negligent or 
liable because he was not the driver. On the other 
hand, Ross's affirmative defense focuses on the 
running of the statute of limitations. Even if the 
claim had been properly filed, Ross's defense would 
be that he did not act negligently. A disposition as 
to either party does not affect the claims or defenses 
available to the other *637 party. Thus, where they 
do not have the "same" legal interest there is no 
identity of interest. 
**20 Had there been an identity of interest, there 
would necessarily be no prejudice. In Nunez, the 
court stated, "new defendants sought to be added 
must have an identity of interest with the original 
party named in the complaint, 'so it can be assumed 
or proved the relation back is not prejudicial.' " Id. 
at | 29 (emphasis added) (quoting Wilcox v. 
Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996) 
); see Doxey-Layton, 548 P.2d at 905 (same). If 
prejudice alone dictated whether an identity of 
interest existed, the exception to amending 
complaints would swallow the rule and allow 
relation back whenever an unnamed party happened 
to know about the filing of a complaint. Therefore, 
because we find that no identity of interest exists 
between Father and Ross, we need not address 
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whether there was prejudice. Furthermore, because 
there is no identity of interest Penrose's Amended 
Complaint cannot properly relate back. 
CONCLUSION 
**21 The trial court correctly determined there 
was no identity of interest between Father and Ross 
to permit relation back of the Amended Complaint 
adding Ross as a defendant. Relation as father and 
son and Ross's possible knowledge of the Original 
Complaint are insufficient to create a legal identity 
of interest in the lawsuit. [FN7] Thus, we affirm. 
FN 7. U/e note that the relation-back 
provision is an exception to the statute of 
limitations. Penrose had four years to 
ascertain the identity of the driver of the 
car that allegedly injured her. She did not 
commence that inquiry early enough to 
avoid the expiration of the statute of 
limitations. 
**22 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges. 
71 P.3d 63 \ \ Utah \dv Rep. 34, 2003 UT 
App 157 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
ORME, Judge: 
* 1 It is questionable whether Appellant's opening 
brief adequately marshals the evidence. See Atlas 
Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2002 UT 112, 
fflf 41-43, 61 P.3d 1053 (requiring an appellant to 
"undertake and meet its heavy marshaling burden in 
its opening memorandum of law on appeal" rather 
than "in its reply brief). Although the brief does 
refer to some testimony supporting each challenged 
finding, it cannot be said that Appellant's counsel, 
in undertaking the marshaling burden, has amassed 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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all of the supporting evidence, as required by West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
For example, Appellant challenges finding 
seventeen, which states that she "has repeatedly 
and continuously failed to provide the children with 
adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, or other 
care necessary for [the children's] physical, mental, 
and emotional health and development." Appellant's 
purported marshaling as to this finding consists only 
of the following statement: "The evidence presented 
at trial that supports this finding deals only with the 
alleged instability of Appellant's housing situation 
and that Appellant had not paid child support." It 
can hardly be said that this vague evidentiary 
summary includes "every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports " 
finding seventeen. Id. (emphasis in original). 
Noticeably absent from this summary is the fact, as 
the State pointed out in its brief, that it is the foster 
parents rather than Appellant who have provided 
the children with sustenance for a substantial 
amount of time, both before and after they became 
the children's foster parents. 
However, we need not delve into a 
finding-by-finding analysis of the adequacy of 
Appellant's marshaling effort because we can 
readily resolve this case on the merits. The State 
presented evidence that supports all of the findings 
that Appellant challenges. Although much of 
Appellant's and her mother's testimony is contrary 
to the State's evidence, we defer to the juvenile 
court's credibility determinations, and we do not 
disturb the reasonable inferences it drew from the 
testimony it heard. See State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 
879 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ("Ultimately, it is the 
province of the trier of fact to determine which 
testimony and facts to believe and what inferences 
to draw from those facts."). Therefore, Appellant's 
factual challenges are unavailing. 
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As for the question of whether the trial court was 
subject to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(3) (2002), 
Appellant did not preserve any such argument 
below and her opening brief fails to "argue plain 
error or exceptional circumstances, and we 
therefore decline to address [this] claim." In re S.Y., 
2003 UT App 66,H 14, 468 Utah Adv. Rep. 10. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2003 WL 21290704 (Utah 
App.), 2003 UT App 108 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Tammy BRONSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
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No. 990997-CA. 
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Before * ACKSON, BILLINGS, and DAVIS, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
BILLINGS. 
*1 Plaintiff-appellant Tammy Bronson appeals the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment against her 
and in favor of defendant-respondent Jones and its 
denial of Bronson's motion to amend her complaint. 
We affirm. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). We review a grant of summary 
judgment for correctness. See Carter v. Milford 
Valley Mem'l Hosp., 2000 UT App 21, % 12, 996 
P.2d 1076. 
To establish alienation of affection, Bronson "must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was 
the conduct of [Jones] that constituted a controlling 
cause of the injury to [Bronson's] consortium 
interests and that [Jones's] conduct was not just 
incidental to other causative factors that destroyed 
or damaged the marriage or conjugal relationship." 
Norton v. McFarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah 1991). 
© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No 
Page 1 
As explained by the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
In order for liability to arise for alienation of 
affections there must be active and affirmative 
conduct. Inaction is not enough to subject a 
defendant to the liability. There must be some act 
on the part of the defendant intended to induce or 
accomplish the results.... It is only when there is 
such active participation, initiative, or 
encouragement on the part of the defendant that 
he or she has in fact played a substantial part in 
inducing or causing one spouse's loss of the other 
spouse's affections, that liability arises. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 683 cmt. g 
(1977) (emphasis added). 
The trial court interpreted Norton to require 
Bronson to identify the existence of efforts to 
alienate by Jones, aimed directly at Mr. Bronson, 
which were the controlling cause of the Bronsons' 
marital discord. It was undisputed that, while Jones 
had contacted Mrs. Bronson, Jones had not 
contacted Mr. Bronson in four years, except for one 
telephone call in 1998. Thus, the court determined 
that Jones did not actively pursue Mr. Bronson such 
that Mrs. Bronson could prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that Jones's conduct toward 
Mr. Bronson was the controlling cause of the 
marital discord. 
Bronson argues that her affidavit, as well as the 
affidavits of her sisters-in-law Amy and Tina 
Bronson, raised material issues of fact with regard 
to Jones's conduct. However, while these affidavits 
do address Jones's alleged conduct toward Mrs. 
Bronson, they do not identify any alienation efforts 
aimed directly at Mr. Bronson. Thus, the trial court 
was correct in granting summary judgment in favor 
of Jones. 
Bronson also argues the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying her motion to amend her 
complaint to plead invasion of privacy. Under the 
I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure, once responsive 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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pleadings have been filed, "a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires." Utah 
R.Civ.P. 15(a). "The standard of review of a denial 
to amend pleadings is abuse of discretion." Kasco 
Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 91 (Utah 1992). 
*2 This court has held that "Utah courts should 
consider the following factors in determining 
whether to allow amendment: (1) the timeliness of 
the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and (3) 
any resulting prejudice to the responding party." 
Atcitty v. Board of Educ, 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 
(Utah Ct.App.1998) (citing Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 
845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct.App.1992)). 
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Bronson's motion to amend. 
First, Bronson attempted to set forth new issues in 
her amended complaint. Second, Bronson filed her 
motion after Jones had filed her summary judgment 
motion. Third, we conclude that Bronson was aware 
of the "new issues" raised in the amended complaint 
long before her motion was filed, and that there was 
no justifiable reason for the delay. We therefore 
affirm the trial court's denial of Bronson's motion to 
amend her complaint. 
JACKSON, A.P.J. and DAVIS, J., concur. 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33244137 (Utah 
App.), 2000 UT App 284 
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